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VI 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0) (2002), and not section 78-2-2(3)0'), cited by Appellants. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
First Issue: Did the trial court clearly err when it found that appellee Aris 
Vision Institute never vacated and never surrendered or intended to surrender the leased 
premises? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a question of fact—not a question 
of law, as Appellants suggest.1 Appellants never preserved the abandonment issue as 
they presently argue it. See Part 11(A), below. 
Second Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it found a 
forcible detainer based on findings that appellant Wasatch Property Management 
Aris has been unable to locate any Utah cases squarely addressing the standard of 
review of findings related to an alleged abandonment of a lease. However, Utah courts 
uniformly provide that "abandonment" in other contexts centers on a party's intent and is 
a fact question. See Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
("When dealing with contract rights, abandonment turns on questions of fact and is to be 
determined from the circumstances of the case, including the intentions and other actions 
of the parties."); In Re Drainage Area of Bear River in Rich County, 12 Utah 2d 1, 4 n.2, 
361 P.2d 407, 409 (1961) (abandonment of water rights); Gurgel v. Nichol 19 Utah 2d 
200, 202, 429 P.2d 47, 48 (1967) (abandonment of personal property); Nu-Trend Elec, 
Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, Inc., 786 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (abandonment of constmction project); Southern Utah Mortuary v. Roger D. Olpin 
Southern Utah Mortuaries, 776 P.2d 945, 949 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (abandonment of 
trade name). 
Other jurisdictions have confirmed that whether a lease is abandoned is a fact 
question. See Bowdoin Square, L.L.C. v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 873 So. 2d 
1091, 1100 (Ala. 2003) ("The issue whether the lease was terminated by abandonment of 
the premises is a question of fact."); Walker-Smith Co. v. Whaley, 185 S.W.2d 614, 616 
(Tex. 1945) ("Whether [the tenant] abandoned . . . the premises was a question of fact."). 
1 
forcefully and unlawfully barred Aris from entering the Premises to remove its personal 
property on multiple occasions and even changed the locks? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a mixed question of law and 
fact—and not a pure question of law, as Appellants suggest. See State v. Hansen, 2002 
UT 125, f 26 n.3, 63 P.3d 650 ("A mixed question involves 'the application of law to fact 
or, stated more fully, the determination of whether a given set of facts comes within the* 
reach of a given rule of law.'") (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 
Matters of statutory construction are questions of law to be reviewed for correctness. See 
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991). Questions of fact are reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard, giving deference to the trial court. See id at 425. However, 
"[t]he trial court's application of law to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion." 
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997); Clark v. Clark, 2001 
UT 44, TJ 14, 27 P.3d 538 (holding that trial court's application of statute to findings of 
fact "will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion"). Appellants preserved some, 
but not all, of their forcible detainer arguments. See Part III(B), (D), (E), (F) below. 
Third Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ruled that 
Appellants unlawfully excluded and wrongfully evicted Aris based on express factual 
findings that without judicial process, Wasatch prevented Aris on multiple occasions 
from entering the Premises with intent to deprive Aris of entry? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a mixed question of law and 
fact—and not a pure question of law, as Appellants suggest—which is reviewed under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard. See authorities cited above with respect to the second issue. 
2 
Appellants rely solely on their unpreserved abandonment arguments, and fail completely 
to address the wrongful exclusion statute. See Part IV, below. 
Fourth Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it concluded that 
Appellants converted Aris's personal property when, the trial court found, Wasatch 
seized Aris's property without judicial process or other legal justification, using the 
equipment as a bargaining chip to force Aris to pay rent? 
Standard of Review: While the conclusion of what constitutes a conversion 
poses a question of law, the application of the law of conversion to the trial court's 
findings involves a mixed question of law and fact to be reviewed with some deference to 
the trial court. See authorities cited above with respect to the second issue. Appellants 
failed to preserve many of their conversion arguments. See Part V(A), (B), (D), (E), 
below. 
Fifth Issue: Were the trial court's damages findings clearly erroneous when 
they were based on unrebutted (and unmarshaled) expert and fact-witness testimony that 
Aris's property depreciated while in Wasatch's custody, and that various items were lost 
or stolen after they were seized? 
Standard of Review: Appellants correctly observe that the review of the 
trial court's various findings of damages involves a clearly erroneous standard. 
Appellants raise new damages arguments for the first time on appeal. See Part VI(A)(1), 
(3), (4), below. 
3 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The interpretation of several provisions of Utah's forcible entry and 
detainer statute are of central importance. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-36-2, -10, -12, -
12.3 (2002). The entire statute is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Aris commenced this action against its landlord, JDJ Properties, and JDJ's 
property manager and agent, Wasatch Property Management, for wrongful eviction, 
forcible detainer, and conversion. The action was tried before the lower court, sitting 
without a jury, on October 14, 15, and 16, 2003. The trial court entered a Memorandum 
Decision dated January 27, 2004 [R.369-75],2 and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on March 25, 2004 [R.480-504], Wasatch and JDJ appeal from 
those findings and conclusions and from the Judgment awarding damages against them in 
the principal amount of $553,506.51 (including treble damages), a security deposit of 
$13,393.89, and costs and attorney fees of $72,956.87, for a total judgment of 
$639,857.30. [R.505-07.] A copy of the Judgment is attached as Addendum B. 
2
 References to the trial court record appear as [R._]. Relevant pages from the four 
volumes of trial transcripts, which are marked as part of the record as R. 526, 527, 528, 
and 529, are cited by the page of the record and the page of the transcript, e.g., [R.527 at 
56]. 
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Aris's Utah Center 
Appellee Aris Vision Institute, Inc., ("Aris"), a California corporation, 
owned and operated a laser eye surgery center (the "Center") located in Suites 100 and 
120 (the "Premises") within the Woodlands Business Park Tower I in Murray, Utah (the 
"Building"). Aris employed David Skalka as Center manager and contracted with four 
physicians (the "Doctors") who performed surgeries at the Center using Aris's three 
lasers and other equipment. Aris had a 1995 lease agreement (the "Lease") with 
Appellant JDJ Properties, Inc., ("JDJ"), secured by a $13,393.89 deposit. JDJ's sister 
company and agent, Wasatch Property Management, Inc., ("Wasatch"), managed the 
Building and collected rents. [Findings of Fact ^ 1-5, 7-9, 84.] 
Wasatch and JDJ's Relationship with Skalka and the Doctors 
Skalka and the Doctors had been Wasatch's tenants long before Aris 
opened the Center, and had enjoyed a long-standing relationship with Appellants. The 
Doctors had even performed vision correction surgery for Wasatch's building manager, 
Dennis Peacock, and Appellants' owner, Dell Loy Hansen . In mid-2001, Anita 
Lockhart, Wasatch's property manager, began negotiating with Skalka and the Doctors to 
set up a competing center in vacant space in the same building at a more advantageous 
rent. Skalka informed Lockhart that Aris would file for bankruptcy and that Skalka and 
the Doctors were going to separate from Aris. Unbeknownst to Aris, Skalka and 
Lockhart's negotiations culminated in a January 1, 2002, lease between Wasatch and 
For the Court's convenience, the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law [R.480-504], which are cited extensively herein, are attached as Addendum C. 
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Skalka and the Doctors for other space in the Building. Wasatch had a large amount of 
vacant space at the time, and never attempted to negotiate with Skalka and the Doctors to 
remain in the Premises rather than relocate. [Findings of Fact ]ffl 10, 19, 41-42.] 
Aris's Closure of the Utah Center and Termination of Skalka 
After a severe industry downturn, Aris determined to close the Center and 
on January 4, 2002, terminated Skalka. Aris tried to sell to Skalka and the Doctors Aris's 
equipment located on the Premises, and also have them assume the Lease. During those 
negotiations, Skalka and the Doctors continued to occupy and perform surgeries on the 
Premises. Aris missed its January rent payment. [Findings of Fact ^j 11-15.] 
Sometime after the 1st of January, Peacock and Lockhart confronted Skalka 
regarding the rent. Skalka told them about his termination and Aris's financial trouble, 
and Peacock responded that Aris's equipment and furniture could not be removed under 
any circumstances. [Findings of Fact ^ 16-19.] 
Aris's negotiations with Skalka and the Doctors proved unsuccessful, and 
Aris arranged to sell its furniture and equipment to pay escalating debts. Aris sent 
Richard Enright, a manager, to remove and store Aris's property pending its sale. 
[Findings of Fact ffif 20-21.] 
Enright's Visit to the Premises and Peacock's Exclusion of Enright 
On January 22, 2002, Enright proceeded to the Premises, met Skalka, and 
stated that he had come to remove Aris's property. Skalka recited Peacock's directive 
that no property be removed, and advised Enright to speak directly to Peacock. Skalka 
introduced Enright to Peacock, who indicated that Wasatch had seized Aris's property 
6 
because Aris had abandoned the Premises by failing to pay the January rent. Enright 
tendered a check for the rent, but Peacock refused it and refused to release Aris's 
property. [Findings of Fact ^j 22-27.] 
While Enright was still on the Premises, Peacock spoke by phone to 
Kathleen Soto, Aris's CFO, who also requested the release of Aris's property to Enright. 
Peacock repeated what he had told Enright, and Soto offered to wire the rent payment 
immediately. Peacock refused to accept the rent and refused to release Aris's property. 
Peacock then directed Enright to leave the Premises immediately and threatened to have 
the police forcefully remove Enright if he ever returned. Pursuant to Peacock's demand, 
Enright promptly left without removing Aris's property. [Findings of Fact fflf 28-33, 35.] 
The Filing of the Action and the Demand to Dahlstrom 
The next day, Aris's counsel, Erik Olson, filed this action and contacted 
Appellants' counsel, John Dahlstrom, seeking leave to enter the Premises and remove 
Aris's property. Olson also tendered by letter Aris's January rent. Dahlstrom refused to 
release Aris's property and never accepted the tender of the rent. [Findings of Fact ^ 
37-39.] 
Negotiations with Skalka, Skalka's Move, and Peacock's Lock Change 
Dahlstrom proposed that Aris and Wasatch negotiate a "business solution" 
with Skalka and the Doctors to sell them Aris's pioperty and have them assume the 
Lease. Aris agreed to pursue such an arrangement without knowing of Skalka and the 
Doctors' long-negotiated, January 1, 2002, lease for a new, competing center in the 
Building. [Findings of Fact ffif 40-42.] 
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By relocating Skalka and the Doctors to a vacant suite, Wasatch intended to 
eliminate that vacancy and then look to Aris for payment of full rent for the Premises. 
With Aris in financial trouble, Wasatch believed that holding Aris's personal property 
would ensure payment under the Lease. Moreover, by providing to Skalka and the 
Doctors a substantially more favorable lease, Wasatch made it unlikely that Skalka and 
the Doctors would assume Aris's lease. [Findings of Fact ^ 43-^4.] 
Not surprisingly, no agreement was reached with respect to re-leasing the 
Premises to Skalka and the Doctors. On or about February 9, 2002, Skalka and the 
Doctors relocated to their new space without Wasatch's supervision. Peacock then 
changed the locks to the Premises, but never provided a key to Aris and never advised 
Aris that the locks had been changed. Skalka and the Doctors later negotiated with 
Wasatch to build out a new, larger surgery center in an expensive, premium suite in an 
adjacent JDJ building. [Findings of Fact ffif 45-47, 93.] 
Aris never vacated the Premises prior to January 22, 2002, nor did Aris 
ever intend or offer to surrender the Premises, nor did Wasatch or JDJ intend to accept 
such surrender. Rather, since Peacock refused to release Aris's property, it remained on 
the Premises and Aris was unable to surrender. [Findings of Fact fflf 90-91.] 
Aris's Motion for Writ of Replevin 
On February 15, 2002, Aris served a motion for writ of replevin seeking the 
return of its equipment, and noticed a hearing. Dahlstrom did not relent, informing Olson 
that he would oppose the replevin and demand a large bond. Based on Dahlstrom's 
opposition and insistence on a sizeable bond, Aris agreed to postpone indefinitely the 
8 
replevin hearing and work with Wasatch to locate a new tenant. But neither Olson nor 
Aris ever intended to waive, settle, or release any claims. [Findings of Fact ^ 48-56.] 
Aris's Supervised Visits and Inventories 
On various occasions between March and June 2002, Aris was provided 
limited, supervised access to the Premises. Aris had to obtain Wasatch's permission and 
was accompanied on visits by Peacock, who kept the keys, unlocked the Premises, and 
stood guard. Peacock considered it his job to supervise visitation and not allow anyone— 
including Aris—to take any property from the Building. [Findings of Fact fflf 57-58.] 
During these supervised visits, Enright inventoried Aris's property and 
discovered that three pieces of equipment had been removed since January 22, 2002: 
a. A Statim autoclave worth $393.60; 
b. A Compaq laptop worth $574.98; and 
c. A Hansatome microkeratome worth $14,164.68. 
Enright also discovered that sunglasses worth $985.56 had been removed, and that two of 
Aris's lasers had been damaged while in Wasatch's custody. [Findings of Fact ^f 59-62, 
80-81.] 
The Barber Equipment Sale and Peacock's Second Lock Change 
On May 20, 2002, Aris agreed to sell a few pieces of its equipment to a 
competitor, Ed Barber, for $35,000. Olson sought Dahlstrom's consent to the sale. 
Dahlstrom indicated that he would check with Wasatch, but that he did not anticipate a 
problem. Olson arranged with Peacock a supervised meeting on the Premises to close the 
sale. During a June 10th meeting, Dahlstrom barred the sale, indicating that Wasatch had 
9 
not yet approved it. Dahlstrom later indicated that Wasatch would only permit the sale if 
Aris paid all the proceeds to Wasatch. Peacock then changed the locks on the Premises a 
second time. Again, he failed to notify Aris or provide a key. [Findings of Fact ^j 64-
68, 70.] 
Dahlstrom's Ultimate Release of the Equipment to Aris 
Olson informed Dahlstrom that Aris had no intention of paying any 
proceeds from the Barber sale to Wasatch, and intended instead to proceed with the 
lawsuit. On or about June 25, 2002, Dahlstrom informed Olson for the first time that 
Wasatch never intended to withhold Aris's property and that Aris could now remove it 
all. Lockhart directed Peacock to release Aris's property, which was a change from 
previous instructions. [Findings of Fact ^ | 73-76.] 
Aris's Removal of Its Property and Its Depreciated Condition 
Soto removed all of Aris's personal property from the Premises on July 2, 
2002. Unfortunately, by that time, Aris's equipment had depreciated dramatically. Laser 
surgery equipment depreciates extremely rapidly and becomes obsolete because new 
models are released every 12 to 18 months. Aris could have obtained $200,000 per laser 
in January 2002, but only $55,000 to $60,000 in July 2002. Aris paid off loans on the 
lasers, sold one to VISX for a loss, and sold the two damaged lasers to VISX for a credit 
against Aris's debt. Based on the damage that the two lasers had sustained, VISX 
deducted $53,000 from the credit Aris received. [Findings of Fact ffil 77-78, 82-83.] 
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The Trial Below 
JDJ counterclaimed against Aris for unpaid rent. [R.l03-12.] At a three-
day bench trial, Soto, Enright, Peacock, Lockhart, Skalka, Olson, and Dahlstrom each 
testified as fact witnesses. [R.526 at 35-111, 152-162; 527:164-350; 528:352-532.] 
Aris introduced a written report and testimony from its expert appraiser, Richard 
Holdren, that Aris's property had depreciated while in Wasatch's custody by 
$118,568.81. [Findings of Fact | 79; R.l 12-51; PI. Ex. 51.] Wasatch offered no rebuttal 
expert or other testimony relating to depreciation. [Id.] 
The trial court issued a memorandum decision, findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and judgment. [R.369-75, 480-504, 432-34.] The trial court found that Wasatch 
improperly seized Aris's property without judicial process, using it as a "bargaining chip" 
to force Aris to pay rent. [Findings of Fact fflf 88-89.] Moreover, the trial court found 
that Aris had never vacated or intended to surrender the Premises, but was forcefully 
prevented by Wasatch from enjoying free, unfettered access to the Premises. [Findings 
of Fact ffi| 86-87.] 
Based on detailed findings, the trial court entered judgment against 
Wasatch and its principal—JDJ—on the wrongful eviction, forcible detainer, and 
conversion claims. [R.505-07.] The trial court awarded $118,568.81 for the 
depreciation of Aris's property, $16,118.82 for the value of Aris's missing property, and 
$53,000 for the damage to Aris's lasers, and trebled damages under the forcible detainer 
statute. [Conclusions of Law ^ 14-15.] The trial court also awarded Aris's security 
deposit of $13,393.89 (less unpaid January rent of $9556.38), along with costs and 
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attorney fees. [Conclusions of Law ^ 17-18; R.505-07.] Finally, the trial court 
dismissed JDJ's counterclaim, concluding that Aris's rental obligations were completely 
abated as a result of the eviction. [Conclusions of Law f 20.] This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Aris prevailed below on multiple alternative theories. On appeal, Wasatch 
and JDJ wholly ignore the 98 paragraphs of factual findings entered by the trial court, 
instead re-arguing the evidence from their own point of view, which the trial court 
already rejected. Based on Appellants' failure to marshal, the Court can assume that trial 
court's findings are supported by sufficient evidence. 
First, Appellants make the new argument that Aris abandoned the Premises 
on January 4, 2002. This argument fails because it was never preserved, and also because 
abandonment is a fact question that the trial court answered with multiple unchallenged, 
unmarshaled factual findings. The trial court expressly found that Aris never vacated the 
Premises and never intended to surrender the Lease. That finding was not clear error but 
was supported by the evidence. No "presumption" of abandonment comes into play 
because the trial court found that Aris was occupying the Premises at the time it was 
excluded. 
Second, Appellants make various arguments—most of them unpreserved— 
against the trial court's application of the forcible detainer statute to its unchallenged 
factual findings. Even putting aside Appellants' preservation problems, Appellants fail to 
address the plain terms of the statute, which required the trial court simply to find that 
Appellants unlawfully held and kept the Premises by force. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-
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36-2(1) (2002). The trial court so found, and thus did not abuse its discretion in applying 
the forcible detainer statute to its findings. 
Third, Appellants spend one paragraph of their brief addressing wrongful 
eviction, relying entirely on their unpreserved abandonment claim. Yet, irrespective of 
Appellants' preservation, marshaling, and briefing deficiencies, the trial court entered 
multiple findings establishing that Appellants willfully excluded Aris from the Premises 
without judicial process, rendering them liable under the unlawful exclusion statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-36-12 (2002), as well as the tort of wrongful eviction. The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in applying the law of wrongful eviction to its findings. 
Fourth, Appellants offer various unpreserved, inadequate arguments on the 
conversion claim, ignoring a lengthy series of findings that they seized Aris's property— 
in which Appellants had no property interest—without judicial process. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in applying the law of conversion to its findings. 
Finally, Appellants attempt to show that the trial court erred in awarding 
damages but, remarkably, fail to challenge any of the trial court's damages findings by 
marshaling the evidence for and against those findings. But even had the evidence been 
marshaled, all three components of the trial court's damages award—the depreciation of 
Aris's property, the value of missing items, and the value of damaged lasers—were 
supported by the evidence below. 
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the forcible 
detainer statute, the unlawful exclusion statute and the tort of wrongful eviction, and the 
law of conversion to its detailed findings regarding Appellants' self-help seizure of Aris's 
13 
real and personal property, and the trial court did not clearly err in awarding damages. 
This Court should affirm. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BASED ON APPELLANTS5 FAILURE TO MARSHAL, ALL 
FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE TAKEN AS TRUE, 
Without marshaling any evidence supporting the trial court's findings, 
Appellants now attempt to reargue the evidence supporting their case, which the trial 
court chose to disbelieve. An appellant's duty to marshal is no novel concept. See Utah 
R. Civ. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding."). The duty to marshal is based on Utah 
appellate courts' "repeated recognition of trial courts' 'advantaged position to evaluate 
the evidence and determine the facts.'" Water & Energy Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 2002 
UT 32, ! 15, 48 P.3d 888 (quoting Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 232 
(Utah 1998)). 
Mere "citation[] to the record . . . is not all that is required." Moon v. 
Moon, 1999 UT App 12, ^  24, 973 P.2d 431. Nor is it sufficient for an appellant to "re-
argue" its own evidence. See id. Rather, the marshaling duty requires that "the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists," West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), and show 
that the trial court's findings are "against the clear weight of the evidence," Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d305, 312 (Utah 1998). 
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This Court has warned litigants that "[w]hen a party fails to marshal the 
evidence supporting a challenged fact finding, we reject the challenge as nothing more 
than an attempt to reargue the case before [the appellate] court." Campbell v. Box Elder 
County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). When the appellant fails to meet its marshaling duty, relevant findings are 
taken as true. See Keil 2002 UT 32 at Tf 15; Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskev, 2001 UT App 
44, If 10 n.5, 19 P.3d 1005; Moon, 1999 UT App 12 at t 24; Utah Med. Prods., 958 P.2d 
at 230. 
Nowhere in Appellants' fifty-page, kitchen-sink brief does any marshaling 
occur. While Appellants challenge various findings and reargue the evidence from their 
point of view, they have completely failed to marshal evidence supporting any of the 98 
paragraphs of factual findings entered by the trial court. As a result, the Court may 
assume that the findings are supported by sufficient evidence. See Moon, 1999 UT App 
12 at 1| 24. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT NO ABANDONMENT 
OCCURRED IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
On two alternative bases, the Court should reject Appellants' abandonment 
defense. First, Appellants failed to preserve the abandonment issue as they now argue it. 
Second, even if the issue were properly before this Court, the trial court's abandonment 
ruling poses a fact question and is supported by multiple unchallenged findings. 
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A, Appellants Failed to Preserve the Abandonment Issue as Now 
Presented on Appeal. 
Appellants cannot raise for the first time on appeal arguments that they 
never gave the trial court the opportunity to consider. See Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 
101,% 30, 16 P.3d 1233; State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 893 n.6 (Utah 1993). An issue is 
preserved if—before the trial court—it is (1) "raised in a timely fashion"; (2) 
"specifically raised"; and (3) supported at trial with "evidence or relevant legal 
authority." State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 6, 975 P.2d 476 (citations omitted). 
"Mere mention" of an issue in trial pleadings, without supporting evidence or legal 
authority, is insufficient. LeBaron & Assocs. v. Rebel Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 482-83 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Here, the trial court provided to the parties "an adequate opportunity to 
speak to all the issues" [R.529 at 569]—and thus preserve arguments—through trial 
briefs [R.189-208, 217-36], opening statements [R.526 at 18-35], both written and oral 
closing arguments [R.265-86, 287-311; 529:544-81], and then even written replies 
[R.346-68]. After all this, Appellants hired new counsel and now attempt to raise new 
arguments on appeal, without setting forth any ground for reviewing unpreserved issues. 
See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(B) ("The brief of the appellant shall contain . . . a statement 
of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court."). 
With respect to abandonment, Appellants' story has inexplicably changed 
in three critical respects. As discussed below, each unpreserved argument is waived. 
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1. Appellants Waived the Abandonment Argument by 
Failing to Argue Below That Aris Vacated on January 4, 
2002. 
Appellants' current abandonment argument is premised on the new 
allegation that Aris vacated on January 4, 2002. [Appellants' Brief at 26.] This 
unpreserved argument was never (1) "raised in a timely fashion"; (2) "specifically 
raised"; or (3) supported at trial with "evidence or relevant legal authority," as this Court 
requires. Maginre, 1999 UT App 45 at f^ 6. 
Appellants argued in their brief to the trial court that "Aris did not Vacate' 
until July 2002" when it removed its property from the Premises. [R.229.] Then, 
contradicting themselves but without clearly enunciating a date, Appellants argued: "In 
the context of abandonment, Ms. Soto testified that she told Mr. Peacock on January 
22nd that Aris was surrendering the lease." [R.304.] Finally, Appellants changed course 
again by stating that "Aris is hard-pressed to deny it abandoned the premises once the 
doctors moved out," which occurred on February 9, 2002. [R.348.] 
For all this waffling, Appellants never specifically argued below that Aris 
vacated on January 4, 2002—the date Appellants use for their current abandonment 
argument. By failing to give the trial court an adequate opportunity to consider this 
argument, Appellants waived that issue. 
2. Appellants Waived the Argument That Aris's Tender 
Was Insufficient. 
Appellants also claim for the first time on appeal that Aris's tender of rent 
in January 2002 "was insufficient because the check that the [trial] court found was 
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tendered did not include interest or a 5% late fee." [Appellate Brief at 28.] This 
unpreserved argument is waived. 
Even if Appellants had preserved the issue, however, unchallenged factual 
findings establish that the tender was sufficient. The trial court found that when Aris's 
counsel, Erik Olson, tendered the rent, Appellants never accepted the tender [Findings of 
Fact Yh 38-39], and there is no evidence that Appellants ever objected to the amount 
tendered. As a result, the tender is "equivalent to the actual production and tender of the 
money," Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-1 (2002), Appellants are "deemed to have waived" any 
objection to the tender, id. § 78-27-3, and Appellants are "precluded" from now objecting 
to the tender, id. Thus, the tender was sufficient to bring Aris's obligations current as of 
January 2002, which supports the trial court's finding that Aris never expressed a "clear 
intention" not to pay rent or be bound by the Lease. See Part 11(B), below. 
3. Appellants Waived the Argument That Aris "Sublet" to 
Skalka and the Doctors. 
Third, Appellants contend for the first time that Aris breached paragraph 
11.1 of the Lease by allegedly "subletting" the Premises to Skalka and the Doctors. 
[Appellants' Brief at 27.] This unpreserved argument is waived. Even if the issue had 
been preserved, the trial court expressly found that no sublease or assignment was ever 
reached. [Findings of Fact f^ 45.] Rather, the trial court found, Aris was merely 
negotiating a possible sublease or assignment. [Findings of Fact f 20.] The trial court 
observed: "Let me just say this, I think Ms. Soto's testimony was quite compelling and 
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my understanding was that at that point she thought these other doctors were going to 
take over the premises and buy the equipment." [R.529 at 567.] 
Not only was there no sublease or assignment, but as the trial court also 
found, by providing to Skalka and the Doctors a substantially more favorable lease in the 
same building, Wasatch made it unlikely that the Doctors would ever assume Aris's 
lease. [Findings of Fact 1f 44.] As of January 1, 2002, and unbeknownst to Aris, Skalka 
and the Doctors had entered into a lease agreement with Appellants for a new space. [Id, 
Tf 41.] As a result, Skalka and the Doctors were neither subtenants nor even potential 
subtenants with respect to the Premises. Rather, by the time of Aris's eviction, they were 
already tenants themselves of another space in the Building. 
Additionally and alternatively, the trial court found that Wasatch 
acquiesced in Skalka and the Doctors' continued presence on the Premises by proposing 
to work out a "business solution" after January 22, 2002. [Findings of Fact |^ 40.] The 
trial court stated, "My understanding is that the new doctors who came on board for a 
brief period of time who subsequently rented different premises from the defendant, were 
there with the joint agreement of the plaintiff and the defendant during the negotiation 
period." [R.529 at 578.] Permitting doctors to stay "was a mutual agreement as part of 
the negotiation between Mr. Dahlstrom and Mr. Olson." Id. Based on Wasatch's 
acquiescence at the time, Wasatch cannot now complain about Skalka and the Doctors' 
presence on the Premises or argue that it was an improper sublease. 
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Finally, even if Aris somehow sublet the Premises to the Doctors, that fact 
would not constitute an abandonment nor would it justify Appellants in taking possession 
of the Premises and Aris's equipment without judicial process. 
B. The Abandonment Defense Fails Based on the Trial Court's 
Unchallenged Factual Findings. 
Even if Appellants had preserved their abandonment arguments, the trial 
court properly determined that Aris never abandoned. An "'[abandonment generally 
occurs when the lessee leaves the rented premises vacant with the clear intention not to 
pay rent or to be bound by the lease.'" State v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966, 970 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (emphasis supplied) (quoting 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 250 
(1995)). Since a finding of abandonment requires a fact-intensive inquiry into the 
tenant's intent, such a finding should not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. See 
Note 1, above. 
1. The Ruling Against Abandonment Is Supported by 
Findings That Aris Never Vacated or Intended to 
Surrender. 
Here, the trial court expressly found that Aris (1) never vacated the 
Premises and (2) never intended to surrender the Lease: 
There is no credible evidence that Aris ever vacated 
the Premises prior to January 22, 2002. Likewise, there is no 
credible evidence that Aris intended or offered to surrender 
the Lease, much less any evidence that Wasatch or JDJ 
intended to accept such surrender. Rather, Aris's personal 
property remained on the Premises, and Skalka and the 
Doctors continued to occupy the Premises until February 9, 
2002. 
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[Findings of Fact ^ 90.] Appellants purport to challenge the first and third sentences of 
this finding, relating to whether Aris vacated the Premises, but completely fail to marshal. 
[Appellants' Brief at 33-34.] Based on the lack of marshaling, this Court can assume 
that the trial court's finding that Aris never vacated is supported by sufficient evidence. 
Since Aris never vacated, this Court should affirm the trial court's finding that no 
abandonment occurred. See Hawkins, 967 P.2d at 970. 
The trial court's ruling on abandonment should also be upheld based on 
Appellants' complete failure to challenge the trial court's finding that Aris never intended 
to surrender the Premises. [Appellants' Brief at 33-34.] Absent some intent to 
surrender—and the trial court expressly found that there was no such intent and no 
surrender [Findings of Fact ^ j 90-91]—there can be no abandonment. See Hawkins, 967 
P.2d at 970; Thomas & Backman on Utah Real Property Law § 5.03(e) at 197 (1999) ("If 
surrender is not accepted by the landlord, we have an abandonment."). The trial court 
even found that Aris was unable to surrender the Premises because Wasatch had seized 
Aris's property. [Findings of Fact f 91.] The Court can assume that these unchallenged 
findings are supported by competent evidence. See Moon, 1999 UT App 12 at f 24. 
The case of Frisco Joe's v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1977), cited by 
Appellants on page 31, is inapposite because in that case, "the trial court expressly found 
that the [tenants] had surrendered the premises." Id at 1330. Here, in contrast, based on 
findings that Aris never vacated, surrendered, or intended to surrender the Premises 
[Findings of Fact ^f 90-91], the trial court's finding of no abandonment was not clear 
error. 
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2. Based on the Trial Court's Factual Findings, There Was 
No Presumption of Abandonment 
Appellants' reliance on section 78-36-12.3 is misplaced. The statute 
provides a presumption of abandonment where "[t]he tenant has not notified the owner 
that he or she will be absent from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 
days after the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence other than the presence of the 
tenant's personal property that the tenant is occupying the premises." Utah Code Ann. § 
78-36-12.3(3)(a) (2004). Here, however, the trial court found the opposite—that Aris had 
never vacated the Premises but instead was occupying it as of January 22, 2002. 
[Findings of Fact t 90.] 
The trial court observed: "[I]t's no one's business what they do there as 
long as it's not unlawful activity. It doesn't matter if they've got doctors there or if 
they're storing equipment there. It's there to use in whatever manner they wish if they're 
paying rent. . . ." [R.529 at 56L] In other words, the fact that Aris was winding up its 
affairs and negotiating a lease assumption with Skalka and the Doctors does not establish 
that Aris had vacated the Premises. The Premises were Aris's "to use in whatever 
manner they wish[ed]," and no deal with Skalka and the Doctors was ever struck. IcL 
With these findings, there could be no presumption of abandonment. 
Even if the presumption had been satisfied, the trial court's findings that 
Aris never vacated and never surrendered or intended to surrender establish that, at 
minimum, Aris successfully rebutted the presumption of abandonment. In all events, due 
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to multiple findings and Appellants' failure to marshal, Appellants have failed to 
establish that the trial court's abandonment ruling was clearly erroneous. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT CONCLUDED THAT WASATCH'S FORCEFUL, UNLAWFUL 
EXCLUSION OF ARIS WAS A FORCIBLE DETAINER. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded based on 
ample findings that "Wasatch and JDJ's forceful, unlawful possession of the Premises 
during Aris's tenancy constituted a forcible detainer as that term is defined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-36-2 (2002)." [Conclusions of Law f^ 9.] Under the forcible detainer statute, a 
landlord is liable for damages when it "takes the law into [its] own hands and turns a 
tenant in peaceable possession out by means of force, fraud, intimidation, stealth, or by 
any kind of violence." Freeway Park Bldg., Inc. v. Western States Wholesale Supply, 22 
Utah 2d 266, 270, 451 P.2d 778, 781 (1969); see also King v. Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 426, 
285 P.2d 1114, 1118-19 (1955) (overruled on other grounds) ("A landlord who is entitled 
to possession must, on the refusal of the tenant to surrender the premises, resort to the 
remedy given by law to secure it."); Paxton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903, 906 
(1935) ("Even rightful owners should not take the law into their own hands . . . ."). The 
forcible detainer statute is plain: "Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer" who "by 
force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds and keeps the possession 
of any real property, whether the same was acquired peaceably or otherwise." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-36-2(1) (2002). 
Thus, to find a forcible detainer, the trial court simply needed to find that 
Appellants (1) unlawfully held and kept the Premises (2) by force. Here, each 
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requirement is met based on uncontroverted findings. First, the findings establish that 
Wasatch unlawfully held and kept the Premises. The trial court found that Wasatch never 
sought judicial assistance in taking possession of the Premises [Findings of Fact ^ 88], as 
Utah law requires. See Freeway, 22 Utah 2d at 270, 451 P.2d at 781; Peterson v. Piatt, 16 
Utah 2d 330, 332, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (1965). Moreover, the trial court found that 
Appellants held and kept the Premises from January 22, 2002, until July 2, 2002, when 
Soto entered the Premises to remove Aris's property. [Findings of Fact fflf 33, 46-47, 57, 
74, 86-87.] During this time, the trial court found, Aris lacked "free and unfettered 
access" to the Premises. [Id. f^ 87.] 
Second, the trial court's findings support a conclusion that the Premises 
were held by force. The trial court found that on January 22, 2002, with no legal basis 
for doing so, Peacock refused to permit Enright to enter the Premises and remove Aris's 
property, and instead "directed Enright to leave the Premises immediately and threatened 
to have the police forcefully remove Enright if he ever returned again." [Id. f^ 33; R.526 
at 45:7-9, 103:9-12.] The trial court found that Peacock then changed the locks on two 
separate occasions [Findings of Fact f^lf 47, 70], and that on multiple occasions, Wasatch 
"prevented Aris from entering into the Premises with intent to deprive Aris of such entry" 
[141186]. 
Based on these findings, none of which Appellants attempt to challenge, the 
trial court properly concluded that Appellants took possession of the Premises by force, 
and continued to hold the Premises by force after sending Enright away. The case of 
Peterson v. Piatt is squarely on point. There, a forcible detainer was found where the 
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landlord changed the locks in the tenant's absence and then prevented the tenant from 
removing his personal property when the tenant returned. 16 Utah 2d 330, 331-32, 400 
P.2d 507, 508 (1965). Based on the similar facts here, the Court should affirm the trial 
court's conclusion that Appellants are guilty of forcible detainer. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-36-10(3). 
Appellants raise a number of arguments—many for the first time—in an 
attempt to discredit the trial court's application of the forcible detainer statute to its 
factual findings. [Appellants' Brief at 29-36.] However, as addressed in detail below, 
each argument fails and should be rejected. 
A. Possession for Five Days Is Not Required. 
Appellants' first argument—that Aris was not in possession for five days 
leading up to the January 22, 2002, forcible detainer—fails on two bases. First, the trial 
court found, "There is no credible evidence that Aris ever vacated the Premises prior to 
January 22, 2002." [Findings of Fact f 90.] Second, the five-day requirement only 
governs subdivision (2) of section 78-36-2, which is not at issue in this case. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-36-2 (2002). Aris brought suit under subdivision (1). Compare Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-36-2(1) (one is guilty of forcible detainer who "by force . . . unlawfully 
holds and keeps possession of any real property"), with Amended Complaint f^ 27 [R.33] 
("By force . . . defendants have unlawfully held and kept possession of the Premises."). 
B. The Doctors9 Presence Does Not Excuse the Forcible Detainer. 
Appellants next argue that Aris could not exercise self-help against Skalka 
and the Doctors. [Appellants' Brief at 31.] This attempt to shift the blame for 
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Appellants' wrongful acts to Skalka and the Doctors fails on numerous bases. First, as 
discussed above, Appellants never preserved this argument that Aris had "sublet" the 
Premises to Skalka and the Doctors. See Part 11(A)(3), above. Second, even had this 
argument been raised, it flies against multiple findings regarding Appellants' long-
standing relationship with Skalka and the Doctors [Findings of Fact fflj 10, 36, 41-44, 46, 
93], findings that Skalka only refused to release Aris's property based on Peacock's 
directive [id. ^ 24], and findings that that from February 9, 2002, onward, the Premises 
were solely within Appellants' control [idLlfll 46-47, 57, 74, 86-87, 89]. 
Third, Appellants offer no authority for the argument that Aris was not 
entitled to enter the Premises and remove its personal property—which Aris alone 
owned—during this time period. Last, even assuming for purposes of argument that Aris 
was not entitled to enter the Premises and retake its personal property and that this issue 
was preserved, there is no authority for the suggestion that Appellants could police Aris's 
business dealings with the Doctors, with whom Aris had contracts in place, and Skalka, a 
former employee. 
C. Appellants Held the Premises by Force. 
Appellants' third argument is that there is no evidence that Wasatch held 
the Premises uby force." [Appellants' Brief at 32.] However, based on Peacock's 
exclusion of Enright, changing of the locks, and ongoing refusal to give Aris free and 
unfettered access to the Premises, as discussed in Part III, above, the trial court properly 
found that Wasatch held and kept the Premises by force. See Peterson v. Piatt, 16 Utah 
2d 330, 331-32, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (1965) (finding forcible detainer under similar facts). 
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Additionally, the Court should reject the notion that Aris's desire for its 
personal property excuses the forcible detainer. Appellants could not force Aris to stay in 
business. Aris was entitled to close its doors. If for some reason Aris's business decision 
to close the Center and remove its property constituted some breach of the Lease—and it 
did not—Appellants would have been entitled to seek judicial relief to prevent the 
removal through a statutory lessor's lien. However, Appellants took no legal process and 
had no authority to exclude Aris. 
D. Aris Never Abandoned the Premises. 
Appellants' fourth argument, that paragraph 20.1 of the Lease permitted the 
forcible detainer, fails because it was never preserved. Even if this argument had been 
raised below, it suffers the same fate as Appellants' abandonment argument. See Part II, 
above. Paragraph 20.1 only gives Appellants the ability to take possession of the 
Premises in the event of "abandonment." [Lease Agreement at ^ 20.1, Trial Ex. 9.] See 
Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985) ("[Contractual provisions 
purporting to authorize [self-help] will be void as against public policy."). Because there 
was no abandonment, the argument under paragraph 20.1 fails. 
E. Appellants Had No Lessor's Lien. 
Appellants openly admit that their lessor's lien argument was never 
preserved below, but make the spurious argument that the issue involves a "pure" 
question of law that can be raised for the first time on appeal. [Appellants' Brief at 3.] 
Appellants cite State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), which only held 
that in criminal cases, the defense of ineffective assistance of counsel can be raised for 
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the first time on appeal. Nothing in Strain permits Appellants to raise any claim for the 
first time on appeal. 
However, even if this Court were to consider the lessor's lien claim, it 
should still be rejected on two alternative bases. First, based on Aris's tender of rent and 
Appellants' waiver of any objection thereto, Aris was current in its January rent 
obligations and no rent was due. See Part 11(A)(2). And, a lessor's lien only arises "for 
rent due." Utah Code Ann. § 38-3-3 (2001). Since no rent was due, there could be no 
lessor's lien. 
Second, even if rent had been due when the forcible detainer occurred, 
Appellants never perfected their lessor's lien. A landlord may only take possession of a 
tenant's property by perfecting a landlord's lien for past-due rent, which requires legal 
process. Id.; Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldg., N.V„ 663 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1983) (even where 
landlord "had possession of the [tenant's] equipment," landlord could only perfect 
landlord's lien by 'Tiling a complaint and issuing a writ of attachment"). Here, 
Appellants took no legal process at all [Findings of Fact f^ 88], and thus cannot argue that 
they ever perfected a lessor's lien against Aris's personal property. 
F. Forcible Detainer Does Not Require a Demand for Restitution. 
Appellants next suggest for the very first time that Aris cannot recover for 
forcible detainer because the trial court's judgment does not contain an order of 
restitution. This argument should be rejected because (1) it was never preserved, and (2) 
Aris was entitled to waive the remedy of restitution. 
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1. Appellants Never Raised the Restitution Issue Below and 
Failed to Include It as an Affirmative Defense, 
Appellants' argument that Aris should have sought restitution is waived 
because it was never (1) "raised in a timely fashion"; (2) "specifically raised"; or (3) 
supported at trial with "evidence or relevant legal authority." Maguire, 1999 UT App 45 
at ^ 6. Additionally, Appellants waived the issue by failing to raise it as an affirmative 
defense [R. 108-09] to Aris's amended complaint, which did not seek an order of 
restitution [R.33]. 
Rule 8(c) provides that "[i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall 
set forth affirmatively . . . any . . . matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c). An affirmative defense is "a defense employed to defeat 
the plaintiffs claim by raising matters outside or extrinsic to the plaintiffs prima facie 
case." Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ^  31, 56 P.3d 524; see also 
Creekview Apts. v. State Farm Ins. Co., 771 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("A new 
matter becomes an 'avoidance' when it suggests that a plaintiffs complaint is invalid for 
other reasons not embraced by the pleadings."). 
Appellants' newly raised argument—that Aris's forcible detainer claim 
required a request for restitution of the Premises—is an affirmative defense because it 
suggests that Aris's complaint is invalid for other reasons not embraced by the pleadings, 
namely an alleged duty under the forcible detainer statute to seek an order of restitution. 
See Creekview, 771 P.2d at 693; see also Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (finding that failure to obtain court indorsement on summons under forcible 
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detainer statute was waived when not alleged as affirmative defense); Keller v. 
Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1998) (same). Based on 
Appellants' failure to raise this defense in their answer or at any other point below, it is 
waived. 
2. Aris Was Entitled Not to Elect the Remedy of Restitution. 
Even putting aside Appellants' preservation problems, Aris was entitled to 
elect damages in lieu of restitution. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 437, 
150 P.2d 100, 104 (1944) (affirming judgment for damages in action brought under 
forcible entry and detainer statute, which was "a regular civil action for damages" and not 
for restitution of premises); Peterson v. Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 400 P.2d 507 (1965) 
(affirming judgment for damages in action under forcible entry and detainer statute); 
Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding landlord liable in 
action for damages). It is section 78-36-2 that defines a forcible detainer, and Appellants' 
acts satisfy the definition of forcible detainer in that provision. See Freeway Park Bldg., 
Inc. v. Western States Wholesale Supply, 22 Utah 2d 266, 270, 451 P.2d 778, 781 (1969) 
("Everyone is guilty of a forcible entry who commits the acts specified."). In contrast, 
the remedies provision in section 78-36-10 does not define forcible detainer, but merely 
provides multiple remedies to the aggrieved tenant—restitution and/or damages. 
There certainly is no Utah authority for the proposition that the trial court 
must force an aggrieved tenant to continue occupying the premises after the landlord has 
committed a forcible detainer. Absent some legislative or other authority, the remedy 
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provision in section 78-36-10 should be construed simply to provide multiple alternative 
remedies, and to limit the trial court's discretion when restitution is sought. 
G. Aris Is Not "Relegated to an Action for Conversion." 
Appellants' seventh argument—that Aris is "relegated to an action for 
conversion" [Appellants' Brief at 35]—fails because a landlord is liable for forcible 
detainer when it seizes a tenant's personal property. See, e.g., Pentecost v. Harward, 699 
P.2d 696 (Utah 1985) (holding that landlord can be held liable under forcible detainer 
statute for seizing tenant's personal property without judicial process); Peterson v. Piatt, 
16 Utah 2d at 331-32, 400 P.2d at 508 (1965) (affirming tenant's right to "maintain this 
action for conversion of their property" under forcible detainer statute). 
H. Wasatch's Lock Changes Are Inexcusable. 
Finally, Appellants make the circular argument that since Aris did not 
occupy the Premises after January 22, 2002, Aris was not dispossessed when Peacock 
then changed the locks. [Appellants' Brief at 36.] Of course Aris did not occupy the 
Premises when Peacock changed the locks because Wasatch had already shut Aris out. 
[Findings of Fact ^ 33, 35, 38-39.] From January 22, 2002, onward, the trial court 
found, Aris lacked free access to the Premises, notwithstanding repeated requests for 
access and Appellants' knowledge that Aris wanted access. [Id. ^[ 86-87.] Appellants 
ignore these factual findings, which make Appellants liable for forcible detainer. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANTS UNLAWFULLY EXCLUDED 
AND WRONGFULLY EVICTED ARIS. 
As with the forcible detainer claim, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it entered judgment on Aris's wrongful eviction claim. Appellants spend 
a mere paragraph addressing this claim, relying exclusively on their unpreserved and 
erroneous breach and abandonment arguments. [Appellants' Brief at 36.] Because of 
their failure to preserve the abandonment and breach arguments, see Part 11(A), above, 
and failure to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings that Aris never 
vacated or intended to surrender the Premises, see Part 11(B)(1), above, Appellants cannot 
show that the trial court abused its discretion in applying to its findings the unlawful 
exclusion statute and the law of wrongful eviction. 
Alternatively, even if not for Appellants' preservation, marshaling, and 
briefing deficiencies, the trial court had ample discretion based on myriad findings to 
conclude that Appellants wrongfully evicted Aris. In Utah, it is unlawful for a landlord 
to evict a tenant without following statutory procedures. See Pentecost v. Harward, 699 
P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985) ("Both the statutes and the tort action derived from them 
require that unless a tenant plainly abandons the premises, a landlord must resort to 
judicial process if he wishes to be rid of a tenant in peaceable possession."). As 
addressed in detail below, the trial court properly applied to its findings the unlawful 
exclusion statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12, and common-law wrongful eviction 
authorities, which provide alternate bases for the judgment against Appellants. 
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A, The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Applying the 
Unlawful Exclusion Statute to Its Factual Findings. 
The trial court properly found, based on multiple relevant findings, that 
Appellants violated the unlawful exclusion statute, which prohibits the very conduct in 
which Appellants engaged: "It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a tenant 
from the tenant's premises in any manner except by judicial process." Utah Code Ann. § 
78-36-12 (2002); see also Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1018 (Utah 1991) ("Tenants in 
Utah have a right to be evicted only by judicial process.") (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-
36-12). This provision, which Appellants completely ignore, required findings that (a) 
without judicial process, (b) Appellants "willfully exclude[d]" Aris from the Premises. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12 (2002).4 Both elements were met. 
First, the without-judicial-process element is met by the trial court's finding 
that Wasatch took no judicial process in excluding Aris. [Findings of Fact f^ 88.] 
Second, the willful exclusion element is satisfied by a finding that "[o]n multiple 
occasions, Wasatch prevented Aris from entering into the Premises with intent to deprive 
Aris of such entry." [Findings of Fact 1f 86.] See Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12.3(1) 
(2002) (defining willful exclusion). Based on these unchallenged findings, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in determining that Appellants violated section 78-36-12. 
[Conclusions of Law f^ 7.] 
The only exception to the statute is in the event of an abandonment, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-36-12, which as discussed in Part II, above, never occurred. 
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B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It 
Concluded That Appellants Wrongfully Evicted Aris, 
Additionally and alternatively, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
ruling based on multiple findings that Appellants' misconduct constituted a wrongful 
eviction—"the tort action derived from" the Utah statute. Pentecost v. Harward, 699 
P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985). Appellants' liability under the tort of wrongful eviction 
required findings that Appellants performed "'some act which deprive[d] [Aris] of the 
beneficial enjoyment of the demised premises or materially impair[ed] such enjoyment.'" 
Barker v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 178 P.2d 386, 388, 111 Utah 308, 312 (1947) (quoting 
Black's Law Dictionary).5 The trial court made multiple series of pertinent findings, 
which as discussed below, have not been properly challenged. 
1. Wrongful Eviction Was Established by the January 22, 
2002, Exclusion of Enright 
First, the trial court's findings about what occurred on January 22, 2002, 
support the wrongful eviction ruling. The trial court found that Peacock refused to permit 
Aris to remove its property on that date, favoring his friend Skalka, whom Peacock knew 
had been terminated, and sending Enright away with a threat to have the police physically 
remove him. [Findings of Fact fflf 17, 33, 36.] Wasatch knew that Aris wanted access, 
but instructed Peacock not to allow it, although no legal process had been taken and Aris 
had tendered its rent. [Id. ffi[ 27, 31, 38, 76, 86, 88.] Based on these findings, the trial 
5
 An eviction can be actual, amounting to '"a physical ouster or dispossession'" 
from the premises or some substantial part thereof, or even "constructive," where the 
tenant is not physically ousted from the premises. Barker, 178 P.2d at 388, 111 Utah at 
312 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary). It is unnecessary to plead specifically 
"constructive" or "actual" eviction because the pleading of eviction is "all-inclusive." Id. 
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court did not abuse its discretion when it held that Aris was wrongfully deprived of its 
right to beneficial enjoyment of the Premises. 
2. Wrongful Eviction Was Established by the Ongoing 
Exclusion of Aris and Changing of the Locks, 
The wrongful eviction is also established by findings that the exclusion of 
Aris was not simply a one-time occurrence. Rather than immediately fix Peacock's 
mistake and permit Aris to access the Premises, Appellants continued to bar access and 
even changed the locks without ever providing a key to Aris [Findings of Fact ^} 47, 
70]—acts that are dispositive of wrongful eviction. See Freeway Park Bldg., Inc. v. 
Western States Wholesale Supply, 22 Utah 2d 266, 270, 451 P.2d 778, 781 (1969); 
Peterson v. Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 331-32, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (1965); King v. Firm, 3 
Utah 2d 419, 426, 285 P.2d 1114, 1118-19 (1955) (overruled on other grounds). 
Faced with Aris's motion for writ of replevin and repeated demands to 
access the Premises, Wasatch "prevented Aris from entering into the Premises with intent 
to deprive Aris of such entry." [Findings of Fact fflf 49, 51, 86.] During the entire period 
following the 22nd of January, "Aris did not have free and unfettered access to the 
Premises nor could it remove its personal property from the Premises." [Id. j^ 87.] 
Rather, Aris was forced to make arrangements with Peacock, who had the keys and 
supervised each visit. [Id. ^f 57-58.] 
Based on these factual findings, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it found a wrongful eviction. It is no defense to suggest that Aris had no right to 
possess the Premises. Aris's right to possession was based on its tender of January rent. 
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See Part 11(A)(2), above. Even if Aris's possession were wrongful, however, Appellants 
still could not evict Aris without judicial process. See Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 
696, 700 (Utah 1985). As in Pentecost, where the tenant's rent payments were 
delinquent, see icL at 697-98, Aris could not be turned away from full, peaceable 
possession without judicial process. The wrongful eviction ruling should be affirmed. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
RULING THAT APPELLANTS CONVERTED ARIS'S PERSONAL 
PROPERTY. 
Based on numerous findings, the trial court properly applied the law of 
conversion to the seizure of Aris's property. "[SJeizing a tenant's property by self-help is 
a civil wrong and is actionable as a tort." Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 
1985). A landlord may only take possession of a tenant's property by perfecting a 
landlord's lien for past-due rent, which requires legal process. See Citizens Bank v. Elks 
Bldg., N.V., 663 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1983). As in Pentecost, 699 P.2d at 699-70, where a 
landlord improperly seized the tenant's personal property without judicial process, 
Appellants took the law into their own hands and seized Aris's personal property. 
The trial court found that Aris owned all of the equipment and furnishings 
on the Premises, and that Appellants had no legal interest in any of it. [Findings of Fact 
ffll 84-85.] Yet, the trial court found, Appellants seized control (without judicial process) 
of Aris's property [id. fflf 87- 88], instructed Peacock not to release it [id. f^ 76], refused 
repeated requests to release it [id. f^ 86, 89], stubbornly insisted on its right to retain it [id. 
1ffl 49, 51], conditioned its release on payment to Appellants [id. ^j 67-68], used it as a 
bargaining chip to obtain rent [id. ^ 89], and changed the locks so that Aris could not 
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remove it [id. ^ 47, 70]. Based on these findings, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that Appellants converted Aris's personal property. Each of 
Appellants' arguments on the conversion claim—which ignore the trial court's 
findings—should be rejected. 
A. Aris Never Abandoned the Premises, 
First, Appellants offer the excuse that Aris abandoned the Premises 
[Appelants' Brief at 37], which fails as discussed above. See Part II, above. 
B. Appellants Never Perfected a Lessor's Lien in the Property. 
Second, Appellants suggest they had a lessor's lien against Aris's property 
[Appellants' Brief at 37-38], an unpreserved claim that fails. See Part III(E), above. 
C. Aris Never Waived Its Claim to the Property, 
Third, citing only a pair of federal waiver cases—never argued below— 
Appellants suggest that Aris waived its conversion claim by leaving its property on the 
Premises. [Appellant's Brief at 39.] However, waiver is a fact-sensitive issue that is 
reviewed with deference to the trial court's fmdings. See IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D 
&K Management Inc., 2003 UT 5, ffi[ 7-8, 73 P.3d 320; Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). 
Here, the trial court entered three detailed findings establishing that Aris 
did not intentionally relinquish a known right, namely the right to pursue its various 
damages claims against Wasatch. See Findings of Fact fflf 53-55. Absent some attempt 
by Wasatch to marshal the evidence supporting these findings—none is made—the Court 
can presume that these findings are supported by sufficient evidence. Based on these 
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findings, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that there was no waiver. 
[Conclusions of Law f^ 3.] 
In all events, a tenant is free to enter into settlement discussions with a 
landlord without waiving any rights to damages for the landlord's wrongful acts. The 
court so held in Peterson v. Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 331, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (1965), where 
the landlord changed the locks and refused to permit the tenants to remove their property. 
When the landlord indicated "that the matter would be settled in court," the parties 
proceeded with "considerable negotiations . . . but no settlement was made." Id. 
Notwithstanding the discussions, the court held that the tenants retained the right to sue 
for conversion and affirmed the compensatory and punitive damages award. Id. 
D. Aris Demanded the Return of Its Property. 
Fourth, citing neither the law nor the trial court's findings, Appellants 
suggest for the first time that Aris's demand for its property was not sufficiently "clear." 
[Appellants' Brief at 39.] However, the trial court found that Appellants knew Aris 
wanted its property as early as January 22, 2002, and that "[f]rom this date until the date 
Soto removed Aris's property, Wasatch refused repeated requests by Aris representatives 
for permission to remove Aris's property." [Findings of Fact J^ 86.] Under any standard 
(Appellants cite none), adequate demand was made. 
E, Appellants Took Aris's Property. 
Appellants' last excuse for their conversion is the unpreserved argument 
that Aris could not exercise "self-help" in retrieving its property. This unpreserved 
argument fails for the reasons addressed above in the context of forcible detainer, namely 
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that Aris still occupied—and never sublet—the Premises. See Part 111(B), above. 
Alternatively, Appellants offer no authority for the position that Aris could not retake 
personal property that Aris owned, so long as there was no breach of the peace—and 
there is no evidence of such a breach. In sum, Appellants have failed to show that the 
trial court abused its discretion in entering judgment for conversion. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT'S DAMAGES AWARD WAS NOT CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
The trial court's award of damages on all three claims brought by Aris— 
forcible detainer, wrongful eviction, and conversion—was not clearly erroneous. 
Appellants' utter failure to overcome this exacting standard of review results from 
numerous unchallenged findings relating to Aris's damages. Utah law broadly entitles 
Aris to all damages resulting from Appellants' wrongful acts.6 The trial court found three 
categories of damages: 
(1) $118,568.81, representing the depreciation of Aris's equipment and 
furniture for the time period in which Appellants seized it; 
(2) $16,118.82, representing the aggregate value of the equipment that 
became missing while it was under Appellants' control; 
6
 See Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(2), (3) (2002) (providing that fact finder 
"shall. . . assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from forcible detainer); King v. 
Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 426, 285 P.2d 1114, 1118 (1955) (overruled on other grounds) ("If 
the landlord, contrary to the terms of [the forcible detainer] statute enters by force 
without resort to legal process, he is by statute made civilly liable to the dispossessed 
tenant."); Peterson v. Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 331-32, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (1965) (awarding 
damages in forcible detainer and conversion action for value of personal property and 
even mental anguish); Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985) (in action 
for conversion and wrongful eviction, holding that "[o]ne who resorts to self-help is 
liable to the evicted tenant for all damages proximately caused by the eviction."); 
Lambert v. Sine, 123 Utah 145, 256 P.2d 241 (1953) (awarding damages for wrongful 
eviction that were "natural and proximate consequence of the wrong"). 
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(3) $53,000.00, representing the damage that Aris's lasers sustained 
while in Appellants' custody. 
[Conclusions of Law ^ 14.]7 As addressed in detail below, each component of the 
damages award is supported by detailed factual findings, and each of Appellants' 
arguments should be rejected. 
A. The Depreciation Damages ($118,568.81) Are Supported by 
Findings Based on Unrebutted Fact and Expert-Witness 
Testimony. 
The first category of damages is based on the depreciation of Aris's 
personal property during the period in which it was in Appellants' custody, as the trial 
court found from unrebutted fact and expert-witness testimony: 
78. As both Soto and Aris's expert, Richard 
Holdren ("Holdren"), testified, laser surgery equipment 
depreciates extremely rapidly and becomes obsolete because 
new models are released every 12 to 18 months. As Soto's 
credible testimony indicated, Aris could have obtained 
$200,000 for the lasers in January 2002 and only $55,000 to 
$60,000 for the lasers in July 2002. 
79. As detailed in Holdren's report, the total 
amount by which Aris's personal property depreciated while 
it was within Wasatch's custody is $118,568.81. Wasatch did 
not call any rebuttal expert or otherwise offer any rebuttal 
testimony relating to the depreciation of Aris's property. 
[Findings of Fact ^f 78-79 (emphasis supplied).] Based on the trial court's unchallenged 
finding that Aris's property depreciated by $118,568.81, it was not clear error to award 
damages in this amount, and the Court should affirm. Alternatively, even if Appellants 
had marshaled evidence, each of their arguments about depreciation damages fails. 
7
 The trial court trebled these damages to $563,062.90, as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-36-10(3), deducted Aris's January rent payment of $9556.38, and added Aris's 
security deposit of $13,393.89. [I&ffil 15, 17-18; R.506.] 
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1. The Court Should Reject Appellants' Unpreserved 
Argument That Aris Suffered No Damages Because the 
Equipment Remained on the Premises. 
Appellants argue—for the first time—that Aris never suffered damage 
because the equipment remained on the Premises and, according to Appellants, could 
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have been sold while in Wasatch's custody. [Appellants' Brief at 40-42.] Evan had this 
argument been preserved, it ignores findings that Aris's property depreciated, could not 
be removed, and was used "as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Aris with respect to 
the payment of rent." [Findings of Fact ffif 78-79, 86-87, 89.] When Aris attempted to 
sell some of its equipment, Appellants even conditioned the sale on payment to 
Appellants. [Id. j^ 68.] Based on these uncontested findings, Appellants have no basis for 
suggesting that Aris could have sold the equipment while in Wasatch's custody. 
2. The Court Should Reject Appellants9 Argument That 
There Was Insufficient Evidence at Trial of Depreciation. 
Appellants' argument that there was insufficient evidence of depreciation 
[Appellants' Brief at 42] fails based on Appellants' complete failure to marshal evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings of depreciation. Alternatively, the evidence of 
depreciation was sufficient. 
Appellants also attack as "conclusory" Soto's testimony that Aris had lined up 
buyers in January 2002. [Appellant's Brief at 40.] However, Appellants never objected 
to Soto's testimony at trial [R.527 at 240], and cannot do so on appeal. See City of 
Hildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, ^  16, 28 P.3d 697. Nor have Appellants marshaled 
evidence supporting the findings based on "Soto's credible testimony" that in January 
2002, "Aris arranged for the sale of its equipment and furniture," and "could have 
obtained $200,000 for the lasers in January 2002." [Findings of Fact ffif 21, 78.] 
41 
Soto, whom the trial court found to be a credible witness, testified that laser 
surgery equipment depreciates rapidly, and that Aris could have received approximately 
$140,000 to $145,000 more per laser in January 2002 than in July 2002. [Findings of 
Fact TJ 78; R.527 at 241-44.] Soto testified that she had buyers already lined up in 
January 2002 to purchase the lasers, who fell away when she was unable to produce the 
lasers. [R.527 at 240.] Soto added that while the technology of Aris's S-2 lasers could 
have been upgraded to S-3 by purchasing additional software, that software would have 
cost $75,000 to $100,000 per laser. [R.527 at 278-80.] Moreover, the depreciation did 
not occur in 2001, as Appellants suggest, because the upgrade software was on backorder 
at the time and unavailable. [R.527 at 243-44.] Thus, whether the S-2 lasers could at a 
later date be upgraded to S-3s, the underlying value of Aris's S-2 lasers still dropped 
during the first half of 2002. What was still cutting-edge technology at the beginning of 
2002 was obsolete by July without an expensive upgrade. [Findings of Fact ^ 78.] 
In addition to Soto, Aris offered the report and testimony of its expert, 
Richard Holdren, who testified (and the trial court so found) that laser surgery equipment 
depreciates extremely rapidly and becomes obsolete because new models are released 
every 12 to 18 months. [Findings of Fact t 78; Tr. Ex, 51; R.526 at 118-21.] Holdren 
testified and the trial court found that Aris's property depreciated by $118,568.81 while 
in Wasatch's control. [Findings of Fact f^ 79; R.526 at 121-22.] Importantly, Wasatch 
never offered any expert testimony to rebut Soto and Holdren's testimony about the 
depreciation of the lasers. [Findings of Fact f^ 79; R.529 at 574 (trial court's observation 
that "[t]he problem is, there was not an expert who controverted what [Holdren] said as I 
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recall.").] In sum, had Appellants marshaled the foregoing evidence, this Court should 
still conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings 
regarding depreciation. 
3. The Court Should Reject Appellants9 Argument That 
Holdren's Methodology Was Defective. 
Appellants' argument that Holdren's methodology was defective 
[Appellants' Brief at 42-43] also fails based on Appellants' failure to marshal evidence, 
as well as Appellants' failure to object or call a rebuttal expert below. Appellants ignore 
that Holdren utilized two alternative methods to calculate depreciation, the cost (or 
accelerated depreciation) approach and the market data approach. [Tr. Ex. 51 at 15-21; 
R.526 at 117-121.] Appellants have not contested—below or on appeal—Holdren's 
application of a market data approach, which was based on actual offers that Holdren 
received from Lasik doctors to buy equipment. [R.526 at 117, 120-21.] This approach 
was a sufficient basis for the damages award. 
Appellants instead argue about the accelerated depreciation method, which 
Holdren testified is an industry-standard approach to appraising laser surgery equipment. 
[R.526 at 117-20.] However, Appellants stipulated to the admission of Holdren's report 
[R.526 at 113], never objected to Holdren's qualification as an expert [R.526 at 116-17], 
never objected to Holdren's testimony regarding the two methods by which he calculated 
depreciation [R.526 at 117-22], and never even called their own expert to rebut 
Holdren's methodology [Findings of Fact f^ 79]. Appellants cannot make evidentiary 
objections for the first time on appeal. See City of Hildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, f 16, 
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28 P.3d 697. In sum, Aris's unrebutted evidence was sufficient to support the trial 
court's depreciation findings. 
4. The Court Should Reject Appellants9 Argument That It 
Was Necessary to Introduce the Sale Price of the Lasers. 
Appellants' last depreciation argument, which was never raised during the 
trial, is that Aris should have introduced the actual selling price of its equipment. 
[Appellants' Brief at 43-44.] Even had this argument been preserved, it fails based on 
the trial court's depreciation findings, along with the finding that Aris "could have 
obtained . . . only $55,000 to $60,000 for the lasers in July 2002." [Id TJ 78; R.527 at 242 
(Soto's testimony).] Alternatively, even if there were no evidence of the selling price of 
the equipment, it would not have been dispositive of depreciation. The trial court could, 
and did, find depreciation without evidence of the sale price. In sum, Appellants have 
failed to show that the finding of depreciation damages in the amount of $118,568.81 was 
clearly erroneous. The Court should affirm the damages award. 
B. The Award of Damages for Missing Property ($16,118,82) Is 
Supported by Findings Based on Unrebutted Testimony. 
The second category of Aris's damages is based on findings that some of 
Aris's property became missing while in Wasatch's custody. [Findings of Fact f^lj 59-
60.] Appellants dispute the value attached to the missing equipment [Appellants' Brief at 
45 n.5], but fail to challenge the findings regarding the value [Findings of Fact fflf 80-81]. 
Appellants also complain that there was no evidence establishing who 
removed the property, but it makes no difference. Wasatch's duty was to permit Aris to 
enter and remove its property. Yet, the trial court found, Wasatch instead favored its 
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friends Skalka and the Doctors, permitting them to stay until their new space was ready, 
and keeping Aris's property. [Id. ffif 10, 36, 41, 74-77.] The trial court correctly 
indicated that the uncertainty about who took the equipment was of no consequence: 
Now the point is not [that] we don't know who did it, we 
know that it occurred and it occurred while [Appellants] had 
control of the premises. 
[R.529 at 577.] The trial court did not clearly err when it found that had Appellants 
released Aris's property in January, Aris would have recovered it before anything was 
taken. Thus, the Court should affirm the trial court's finding of $16,118.82 in damages 
for the missing items. 
C. The Award for Damaged Lasers ($53,000) Is Supported by 
Findings Based on Unrebutted Testimony. 
The third category of Aris's damages is based on the trial court's findings 
that Aris's lasers were damaged while in Appellants' control. [Findings of Fact ^ 61 -
62.] Appellants attempt to refute these damages, but again fail completely to marshal the 
evidence supporting relevant findings. As with the damages for Aris's missing property, 
see Part VI(B), above, had Aris been permitted to remove its lasers on January 22, 2002, 
Aris would have been able to avoid the damage that its lasers subsequently sustained. 
The trial court's finding of $53,000 in damages for the lasers was not clearly erroneous. 
D. Appellants Incorrectly Suggest That the Trial Court Awarded 
"Lost Opportunity Damages." 
Appellants make the argument that the trial court should not have awarded 
"lost opportunity damages," ignoring that while Holdren calculated such damages, they 
were never awarded below. [Findings of Fact ^ 79-82; Conclusions of Law ^} 14-15.] 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Appellee Aris Vision Institute, Inc., respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the Judgment entered on March 25, 2004. Based on 
Appellants' failure to marshal, this Court must assume the truth of the trial court's factual 
findings with respect to forcible detainer, wrongful eviction, conversion, and damages. 
Moreover, the Court should reject Appellants' unpreserved arguments. What little 
remains of Appellants' appeal in light of Appellants' marshaling and preservation 
problems is insufficient to overturn the Judgment. This Court should affirm. 
DATED this 5 day of October, 2004. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
R. Stepllen^Marshall / 
Erik A. Olson 
Attorneys for Appellee Aris Vision 
Institute, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 5 ' day of October, 2004,1 caused two copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to be mailed in the United States mail, first-
class postage prepaid to the following: 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Stephen B. Mitchell 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I^A^AuvyKXP 
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703 JUDICIAL CODE 78-35a-304 
CHAPTER 36 
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER 
Section 
78-36-1. "Forcible entry" denned. 
78-36-2. "Forcible detainer" denned. 
78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than 
life. 
78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands to hold 
over. 
78-36-5. Remedies available to tenant against under-
tenant. 
78-36-6. Definitions — Notice to quit — How served. 
78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant. 
78-36-8. Allegations permitted in complaint — Time for 
appearance — Service of summons. 
78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff—Alternative rem-
edies. 
78-36-9. Proof required of plaintiff — Defense. 
78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent — 
Immediate enforcement — Treble damages. 
78-36-10.5. Order of restitution — Service — Enforcement 
— Disposition of personal property — Hear-
ing. 
78-36-1 JUDICIAL CODE 704 
Section 
78 36-11 Time for appeal 
78-36 12 Exclusion of tenant without judicial process 
prohibited — Abandoned premises excepted 
78 36-12 3 Definitions 
78-36-12 6 Abandoned premises — Retaking and 
rerenting by owner — Liability of tenant — 
Personal property of tenant left on premises 
78-36-1. "Forc ib le e n t r y " defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either 
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other parts of a 
house, or by fraud, intimidation or stealth, or by any kind 
of violence or circumstances of terror, enters upon or into 
any real property, or, 
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, turns 
out by force, threats or menacing conduct the party in 
actual possession 1953 
78-36-2. "Forc ib le d e t a i n e r " defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who either 
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, 
unlawfully holds and keeps the possession of any real 
property, whether the same was acquired peaceably or 
otherwise, or, 
(2) in the nighttime, or durmg the absence of the 
occupants of any real property, unlawfully enters thereon, 
and, after demand made for the surrender thereof, refuses 
for the period of three days to surrender the same to such 
former occupant The occupant of real property within the 
meaning of this subdivision is one who within five days 
preceding such unlawful entry was in the peaceable and 
undisturbed possession of such lands 1953 
78-36-3. Unlawful d e t a i n e r by t e n a n t for t e r m less 
t h a n life. 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is 
guilty of an unlawful detainer 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by 
subtenant, of the property or any part of it, after the 
expiration of the specified term or period for which it is let 
to him, which specified term or period, whether estab 
hshed by express or implied contract, or whether written 
or parol, shall be terminated without notice at the expi 
ration of the specified term or period, 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite 
time with monthly or other periodic rent reserved 
(1) he continues in possession of it in person or by 
subtenant after the end of any month or period, in 
cases where the owner, his designated agent, or any 
successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more prior 
to the end of that month or period, has served notice 
requiring him to quit the premises at the expiration 
of that month or period, or 
(u) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains 
in possession of the premises after the expiration of a 
notice of not less than five days, 
(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by 
subtenant, after default in the payment of any rent and 
after a notice in writing requiring in the alternative the 
payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained 
premises, has remained uncomphed with for a period of 
three days after service, which notice may be served at 
any time after the rent becomes due, 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises 
contrary to the covenants of the lease, or commits or 
permits waste on the premises, or when he sets up or 
carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, or 
when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the 
premises any nuisance including nuisance as defined in 
Section 78 38-9, and remains in possession after service 
upon him of a three days' notice to quit, or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by 
subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform any 
condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under 
which the property is held, other than those previously 
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the 
alternative the performance of the conditions or covenant 
or the surrender of the property, served upon him and 
upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the premises 
remains uncomphed with for three days after service 
Within three days after the service of the notice, the 
tenant, any subtenant in actual occupation of the pre 
mises, any mortgagee of the term, or other person inter 
ested in its continuance may perform the condition or 
covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture, 
except that if the covenants and conditions of the lease 
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be performed, 
then no notice need be given 
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile 
home is determined under Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home 
Park Residency Act 
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance m Subsection 78 36 
3(l)(d) are not applicable to nuisance actions provided in 
Sections 78 38 9 through 78 38 16 only 1992 
78-36-4. R igh t of t e n a n t of a g r i c u l t u r a l l ands to ho ld 
over. 
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands, where the 
tenant has held over and retained possession for more than 60 
days after the expiration of his term without any demand of 
possession or notice to quit by the owner, his designated agent, 
or his successor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by 
permission of the owner, his designated agent, or his successor 
in estate, and shall be entitled to hold under the terms of the 
lease for another full year, and shall not be guilty of an 
unlawful detainer during that year, and the holding over for 
the 60 day period shall be taken and construed as a consent on 
the part of the tenant to hold for another year 1981 
78-36-5. Remed ie s ava i l ab le to t e n a n t aga ins t unde r -
t e n a n t . 
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those prescribed 
in this chapter to obtain possession of the premises let to an 
undertenant in case of his unlawful detention of the premises 
underlet to him 1953 
78-36-6. Defini t ions — Not ice to qu i t — How served . 
(1) For purposes of this section 
(a) "Commercial tenant" means any tenant who may be 
a body politic and corporate, partnership, association, or 
company 
(b) "Tenant" means any natural person and any indi 
vidual other than a commercial tenant 
(2) The notices required by Title 78, Chapter 36, Forcible 
Entry and Detainer, may be served 
(a) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally or, if 
the tenant is a commercial tenant, by delivering a copy to 
the commercial tenant's usual place of business by leaving 
a copy of the notice with a person of suitable age and 
discretion, 
(b) by sending a copy through registered or certified 
mail addressed to the tenant at his place of residence or, 
if the tenant is a commercial tenant, by sending a copy 
through registered or certified mail addressed to the 
commercial tenant's usual place of business, 
(c) if he is absent from his place of residence or from his 
usual place of business, by leaving a copy with a person of 
suitable age and discretion at either place and mailing a 
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copy to the tenant at the address of his place of residence 
or place of business, 
(d) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be 
found at the place of residence, then by affixing a copy in 
a conspicuous place on the leased property, or 
(e) if an order of abatement by eviction of the nuisance 
is issued by the court as provided in Section 78 38 11, 
when issued, the parties present shall be on notice that 
the abatement by eviction order is issued and immedi-
ately effective or as to any absent party, notice shall be 
given as provided in Subsections (2)(a) through (e) 
(3) Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same 
manner as provided in Subsection (2) 1997 
78-36-7, Necessary parties defendant. 
(1) No person other than the tenant of the premises, and 
subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation of the 
premises when the action is commenced, shall be made a party 
defendant in the proceeding, except as provided in Section 
78-38 13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be 
nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might have 
been made a party defendant, but when it appears that any of 
the parties served with process or appearing in the proceed 
mgs are guilty, judgment shall be rendered against those 
parties 
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the premises in 
controversy after the service of any notice as provided in this 
chapter, the fact that such notice was not served on the 
subtenant is not a defense to the action All persons who enter 
under the tenant after the commencement of the action shall 
be bound by the judgment the same as if they had been made 
parties to the action 
(3) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a necessary 
party defendant only in an abatement by eviction action for an 
unlawful drug house as provided in Section 78 38 13 1992 
78-36-8. Al legat ions p e r m i t t e d in compla in t — Time 
for a p p e a r a n c e — Service of summons . 
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting forth 
the facts on which he seeks to recover, may set forth any 
circumstances of fraud, force, or violence which may have 
accompanied the alleged forcible entry, or forcible or unlawful 
detainer, and claim damages therefor or compensation for the 
occupation of the premises, or both If the unlawful detainer 
charged is after default in the payment of rent, the complaint 
shall state the amount of rent due The court shall indorse on 
the summons the number of days within which the defendant 
is required to appear and defend the action, which shall not be 
less than three or more than 20 days from the date of service 
The court may authorize service by publication or mail for 
cause shown Service by publication is complete one week 
after publication Service by mail is complete three days after 
mailing The summons shall be changed in form to conform to 
the time of service as ordered, and shall be served as in other 
cases 1987 
78-36-8.5. Possess ion b o n d of plaintiff — Al terna t ive 
r e m e d i e s . 
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint and the 
entry of final judgment, the plaintiff may execute and file a 
possession bond The bond may be in the form of a corporate 
bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property bond executed 
by two persons who own real property in the state and who are 
not parties to the action The court shall approve the bond in 
an amount that is the probable amount of costs of suit and 
damages which may result to the defendant if the suit has 
been improperly instituted The bond shall be payable to the 
clerk of the court for the benefit of the defendant for all costs 
and damages actually adjudged against the plaintiff The 
plaintiff shall notify the defendant that he has filed a posses 
sion bond This notice shall be served m the same manner as 
service of summons and shall inform the defendant of all of the 
alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2) 
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures 
applicable to an action if the plaintiff files a possession bond 
under Subsection (1) 
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based 
solely upon nonpayment of rent or utilities, the existing 
contract shall remain in force and the complaint shall be 
dismissed if the defendant, within three days of the 
service of the notice of the possession bond, pays accrued 
rent, utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, includ 
ing attorney's fees, as provided in the rental agreement 
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if he 
executes and files a counter bond in the form of a 
corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property 
bond executed by two persons who own real property in 
the state and who are not parties to the action The form 
of the bond is at the defendant's option The bond shall be 
payable to the clerk of the court The defendant shall file 
the bond prior to the expiration of three days from the 
date he is served with notice of the filing of plaintiff's 
possession bond The court shall approve the bond in an 
amount that is the probable amount of costs of suit and 
actual damages that may result to the plaintiff if the 
defendant has improperly withheld possession The court 
shall consider prepaid rent to the owner as a portion of the 
defendant's total bond 
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be granted a 
hearing to be held prior to the expiration of three days 
from the date the defendant is served with notice of the 
filing of plaintiff's possession bond 
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with a 
remedy under Subsection (2) within the required time, the 
plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be granted an order of 
restitution The constable of the precinct or the sheriff of the 
county where the property is situated shall return possession 
of the property to the plaintiff promptly 
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Subsection 
(2)(c), and if the court rules after the hearing that the plaintiff 
is entitled to possession of the property, the constable or 
sheriff shall promptly return possession of the property to the 
plaintiff If at the hearing the court allows the defendant to 
remain in possession and further issues remain to be adjudi 
cated between the parties, the court shall require the defen 
dant to post a bond as required in Subsection (2)(b) If at the 
hearing the court rules that all issues between the parties can 
be adjudicated without further court proceedings, the court 
shall, upon adjudicating those issues, enter judgment on the 
merits 1987 
78-36-9. Proof r e q u i r e d of plaintiff — Defense. 
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry or 
forcible detainer the plaintiff shall only be required to show, in 
addition to the forcible entry or forcible detainer complained 
of, that he was peaceably in the actual possession at the time 
of the forcible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the 
time of the forcible detainer The defendant may show in his 
defense that he or his ancestors, or those whose interest in 
such premises he claims, had been in the quiet possession 
thereof for the space of one whole year continuously next 
before the commencement of the proceedings, and that his 
interest therein is not then ended or determined, and such 
showing is a bar to the proceedings 1953 
78-36-10. J u d g m e n t for r e s t i t u t ion , damages , a n d r e n t 
— I m m e d i a t e en fo rcemen t — Treble damages . 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon 
default A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall 
include an order for the restitution of the premises as provided 
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in Section 78-36-10.5. If the proceeding is for unlawful de-
tainer after neglect or failure to perform any condition or 
covenant of the lease or agreement under which the property 
is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment 
shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without 
a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall also assess the 
damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's ten-
ancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved at 
trial; 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful 
detainer is after default in the payment of rent; and 
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as pro-
vided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for 
the rent, for three times the amount of the damages assessed 
under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c), and for reasonable 
attorneys' fees, if they are provided for in the lease or agree-
ment. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in 
the payment of the rent, execution upon the judgment shall be 
issued immediately after the entry of the judgment. In all 
cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately. 
1994 
78-36-10.5. O r d e r of r e s t i t u t i o n — Service — Enforce-
m e n t — Dispos i t ion of pe r sona l p r o p e r t y — 
H e a r i n g . 
(1) Each order of restitution shall: 
(a) direct the defendant to vacate the premises, remove 
his personal property, and restore possession of the pre-
mises to the plaintiff, or be forcibly removed by a sheriff or 
constable; 
(b) advise the defendant of the time limit set by the 
court for the defendant to vacate the premises, which 
shall be three business days following service of the order, 
unless the court determines that a longer or shorter 
period is appropriate under the circumstances; and 
(c) advise the defendant of the defendant's right to a 
hearing to contest the manner of its enforcement. 
(2) (a) A copy of the order of restitution and a form for the 
defendant to request a hearing as listed on the form shall 
be served in accordance with Section 78-36-6 by a person 
authorized to serve process pursuant to Subsection 78-
12a-2(l). If personal service is impossible or impractica-
ble, service may be made by: 
(i) mailing a copy of the order and the form to the 
defendant's last-known address and posting a copy of 
the order and the form at a conspicuous place on the 
premises; or 
(ii) mailing a copy of the order and the form to the 
commercial tenant defendant's last-known place of 
business and posting a copy of the order and the form 
at a conspicuous place on the business premises. 
(b) A request for hearing by the defendant may not stay 
enforcement of the restitution order unless: 
(i) the defendant furnishes a corporate bond, cash 
bond, certified funds, or a property bond to the clerk 
of the court in an amount approved by the court 
according to the formula set forth in Subsection 
78-36-8.5(2)(b); and 
(ii) the court orders that the restitution order be 
stayed. 
(c) The date of service, the name, title, signature, and 
telephone number of the person serving the order and the 
form shall be legibly endorsed on the copy of the order and 
the form served on the defendant 
(d) Within ten days of service, the person serving the 
order and the form shall file proof of service in accordance 
with Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) If the defendant fails to comply with the order 
within the time prescribed by the court, a sheriff or 
constable at the plaintiff's direction may enter the pre-
mises by force using the least destructive means possible 
to remove the defendant. 
(b) Any personal property of the defendant may be 
removed from the premises by the sheriff or constable and 
transported to a suitable location for safe storage. The 
sheriff or constable may delegate responsibility for stor-
age to the plaintiff, who shall store the personal property 
in a suitable place and in a reasonable manner. 
(c) The personal property removed and stored shall be 
inventoried by the sheriff or constable or the plaintiff who 
shall keep the original inventory and personally deliver or 
mail the defendant a copy of the inventory immediately 
after the personal property is removed. 
(4) (a) After demand made by the defendant within 30 days 
of removal of personal property from the premises, the 
sheriff or constable or the plaintiff shall promptly return 
all of the defendant's personal property upon payment of 
the reasonable costs incurred for its removal and storage. 
(b) The person storing the personal property may sell 
the property remaining in storage at a public sale if: 
(i) the defendant does not request a hearing or 
demand return of the personal property within 30 
days of its removal from the premises; or 
(ii) the defendant fails to pay the reasonable costs 
incurred for the removal and storage of the personal 
property. 
(c) In advance of the sale, the person storing the 
personal property shall mail to the defendant's last-
known address a written notice of the time and place of 
the sale. 
(d) If the defendant is present at the sale, he may 
specify the order in which the personal property shall be 
sold, and only so much personal property shall be sold as 
to satisfy the costs of removal, storage, advertising, and 
conducting the sale. The remainder of the personal prop-
erty, if any, shall be released to the defendant. If the 
defendant is not present at the sale, the proceeds, after 
deduction of the costs of removal, storage, advertising, 
and conducting the sale shall be paid to the plaintiff up to 
the amount of any judgment the plaintiff obtained against 
the defendant. Any surplus shall be paid to the defendant, 
if the defendant's whereabouts are known. If the defen-
dant's whereabouts are not known, any surplus shall be 
disposed of in accordance with Title 67, Chapter 4a, 
Unclaimed Property Act. 
(e) The plaintiff may donate the property to charity if: 
(i) the defendant does not request a hearing or 
demand return of the personal property within 30 
days of its removal from the premises; or 
(ii) the defendant fails to pay the reasonable costs 
incurred for the removal and storage of the personal 
property; and 
(iii) donation is a commercially reasonable alterna-
tive. 
(f) If the property belonging to a person who is not a 
defendant is removed and stored in accordance with this 
section, that person may claim the property by delivering 
a written demand for its release to the sheriff or constable 
or the plaintiff. If the claimant provides proper identifi-
cation and evidence of ownership, the sheriff or constable 
or the plaintiff shall promptly release the property at no 
cost to the claimant. 
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(5) In the event of a dispute concerning the manner of 
enforcement of the restitution order, the defendant or any 
person claiming to own stored personal property may file a 
request for a hearing. The court shall set the matter for 
hearing within ten days from the filing of the request, or as 
soon thereafter as practicable, and shall mail notice of the 
hearing to the parties. 
(6) The Judicial Council shall draft the forms necessary to 
implement this section. 2003 
78-36-11. Time for appeaL 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), either party may, 
within ten days, appeal from the judgment rendered. 
(2) In a nuisance action under Sections 78-38-9 through 
78-38-16, any party may appeal from the judgment rendered 
within three days. 1992 
78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial process 
prohibited — Abandoned premises excepted. 
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a tenant from 
the tenant's premises in any manner except by judicial pro-
cess, provided, an owner or his agent shall not be prevented 
from removing the contents of the leased premises under 
Subsection 78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and at-
tempting to rent them at a fair rental value when the tenant 
has abandoned the premises. 1981 
78-36-12.3. Definitions. 
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant from 
entering into the premises with intent to deprive the tenant of 
such entry. 
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and 
shall also have the same meaning as landlord under common 
law and the statutes of this state. 
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following 
situations: 
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she 
will be absent from the premises, and the tenant fails to 
pay rent within 15 days after the due date, and there is no 
reasonable evidence other than the presence of the ten-
ant's personal property that the tenant is occupying the 
premises; or 
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she 
will be absent from the premises, and the tenant fails to 
pay rent when due and the tenant's personal property has 
been removed from the dwelling unit and there is no 
reasonable evidence that the tenant is occupying the 
premises. 1981 
78-36-12.6. Abandoned p remises — R e t a k i n g and 
rerenting by owner — Liability of tenant — 
Personal property of tenant left on premises. 
(1) In the event of abandonment, the owner may retake the 
premises and attempt to rent them at a fair rental value and 
the tenant who abandoned the premises shall be liable: 
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of the 
term; or 
(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to 
rerent the premises at a fair rental value, plus the 
difference between the fair rental value and the rent 
agreed to in the prior rental agreement, plus a reasonable 
commission for the renting of the premises and the costs, 
if any, necessary to restore the rental unit to its condition 
when rented by the tenant less normal wear and tear. 
This subsection applies, if less than Subsection (a), not-
withstanding that the owner did not rerent the premises. 
(2) (a) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and has 
left personal property on the premises, the owner is 
entitled to remove the property from the dwelling, store it 
for the tenant, and recover actual moving and storage 
costs from the tenant 
(b) (i) The owner shall make reasonable efforts to 
notify the tenant of the location of the personal 
property 
(ii) If the property has been in storage for over 30 
days and the tenant has made no reasonable effort to 
recover it, the owner may: 
(A) sell the property and apply the proceeds 
toward any amount the tenant owes; or 
(B) donate the property to charity if the dona-
tion is a commercially reasonable alternative. 
(c) Any money left over from the sale of the property 
shall be handled as specified in Title 67, Chapter 4a, Par t 
2, Standards for Determining When Property is Aban-
doned or Unclaimed. 
(d) Nothing contained in this act shall be in derogation 
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JUDGMENT AGAINST WASATCH 
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., 
AND JDJ PROPERTIES, INC. 
Civil No. 020900624 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
JD13772312 
020900624 WASATCH PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, 
This matter came before the Court at a bench trial, which concluded on October 
16, 2003. Plaintiff Aris Vision Institute, Inc., ("Aris") was represented at trial by R. Stephen 
Marshall, and defendants Wasatch Property Management, Inc., ("Wasatch") and JDJ Properties, 
Inc., ("JDJ") were represented by Todd D. Weiler. Having carefully reviewed all of the evidence 
s ^ 
received at trial, along with the written and oral arguments of counsel, and based on the Court's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Judgment is ENTERED against Wasatch and JDJ, jointly and severally, 
for treble damages in the total amount of $553,506.51 (three times $187,687.63 less the rent due 
in the amount of $9,556.38), attorney fees in the amount of $ , and costs ir 
the amount of $ a total judgment in the amount of $ fpDJc V In 3 3 \ 
together with post-judgment interest at the legal rate; 
2. In addition to the foregoing judgment, judgment is also ENTERED against 
JDJ for the amount of $13,393.89 (secunty deposit), together with post-judgment interest at the 
legal rate; 





4. JDJ and Wasatch's motion to dismiss is DENIED; and 
5. Aris's claims against defendants David Skalka, Brian Skalka, and Dennis 
Peacock are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to serve these defendants with process. 
DATED this /aLday of February, 2004. 
BY JBPS COURT 
<{f\$;> ^ ^ \ Leslie A. Lewis 
y ^ v ^ ^ ^ \ % v ^ i Third District Judge 
:
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JUDGMENT DEBTOR INFORMATION (UTAH CODE ANN § 78-22-1 5) 
1. Judgment debtor Wasatch Property Management, Inc , ("Wasatch") was 
served through its Vice President and General Counsel, John A Dahlstrom, Jr , at 299 South 
Mam Street, Suite 2400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
2 Judgment debtor JDJ Properties, Inc , ("JDJ") was also served through Mr 
Dahlstrom at 299 South Mam Street, Suite 2400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
3 The last known business addresses of Wasatch and JDJ are 299 South 
Main Street, Suite 2400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and 399 North Mam, Suite 200, Logan, 
Utah 84321 
4 The name and address of the judgment creditor is Ans Vision Institute, 
Inc , dba Ans Vision, Inc , 2730 Armacoast Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90064 
5. The tax ID numbers of Wasatch and JDJ are unknown 
6 The judgment has not been stayed 
7 Any further information required by section 78-22-1 5 but not provided m 
this statement is unknown and unavailable to the judgment creditor 
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WASATCH PROPERTY MANAGEMENT/ 
INC., a Utah corporation, JDJ PROPERTIES/ 
INC., a Utah corporation, DAVID SKALKA,/ 
an individual, BRIAN SKALKA, an v 
individual, and DENNIS PEACOCK, an J 
individual, 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 020900624 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
' 
This matter came before the Court at a bench trial on October 14, 15, and 16, 
2003. Closing argument was held on November 14, 2003. The parties submitted written closing 
argument briefs and submitted written responses to the written closing argument briefs. Plaintiff 
Aris Vision Institute, Inc., was represented at trial by R. Stephen Marshall of the law firm of 
M*o 
Durham Jones & Pinegar and defendants Wasatch Property Management, Inc., and JDJ 
Properties, Inc., were represented by Todd D. Weiler of the law firm of Parry Anderson & 
Gardiner. Defendants David Skalka, Brian Skalka, and Dennis Peacock have not been served 
with process in this matter and have not entered appearances. Claims against the three unserved 
defendants were not litigated at trial. 
Having considered the evidence and arguments of counsel, the Court entered its 
memorandum decision in this matter on January 22, 2004, in which the Court directed counsel 
for plaintiff to prepare written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based on the arguments 
of the parties, the testimony and credibility of witnesses at trial, the exhibits and other evidence 
presented at trial, subsequent oral and written submissions to the Court, the Court's 
memorandum decision, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Aris Vision Institute, Inc., ("Aris"), a California company, owned 
and operated a laser eye surgery center (the "Center") located in Suites 100 and 120 (the 
"Premises") within the Woodlands Business Park Tower I in Murray, Utah (the "Building"). 
2. Aris employed David Skalka ("Skalka") as Center manager and contracted 
with four physicians who agreed to perform eye surgeries at the Center (the "Doctors"). 
3. Aris handled the bills for the Center, including all rental payments to the 
landlord. 
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A. Aris placed in the Premises furniture and multiple pieces of surgical 
equipment, including three VISX model S-2 lasers, which were needed to operate the Center. 
5. Aris owned all of the equipment and furniture that it placed on the 
Premises, including the three lasers. 
6. Pursuant to a written lease agreement (the "Lease"), Aris leased the 
Premises from defendant JDJ Properties, Inc., ("JDJ"). 
7. Aris deposited with JDJ the sum of $13,393.89 as a security deposit to 
secure the Lease. 
8. JDJ had an agreement with its sister company, Wasatch Property 
Management, Inc., ("Wasatch"), under which Wasatch agreed to manage the Building and collect 
rents from tenants. All of Wasatch's actions in this matter were within the scope of its agency 
and responsibilities delegated to it by JDJ. 
9. From its Logan, Utah headquarters, Wasatch directed all invoices relating 
to the Premises to Aris's Los Angeles, California headquarters, and Aris mailed all payments, 
including rents, from Aris's headquarters to Wasatch's headquarters. 
10. Long before Aris hired Skalka and the Doctors and opened the Center, 
Skalka and the Doctors had been tenants within the Building and had enjoyed a long-standing 
relationship with Wasatch. Francis Wapner, one of the Doctors, had even performed vision 
correction surgery for Dennis Peacock ("Peacock"), Wasatch's property manager for the 
Building, and Dell Loy Hansen, the owner of JDJ and Wasatch. 
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11. After a severe downturn in the laser eye surgery business, Aris determined 
to close the Center, along with other centers across the United States. 
12. On January 4, 2002, Aris terminated several employees, including Skalka, 
and provided various notices to Skalka and vendors that Aris was "in the unfortunate position of 
having to wind down it[s] current operations and liquidate its business prior to dissolution." 
13. At the time, Aris sought to sell to Skalka and the Doctors all of Aris's 
property located on the Premises, and to have Skalka and the Doctors assume Axis's obligations 
under the Lease. 
14. Through February 9, 2002, while those negotiations moved forward, 
Skalka and the Doctors continued to occupy the Premises and performed surgeries on the 
Premises using Aris's equipment. 
15. Aris did not pay its January rent in the amount of $9,556.38 by January 1, 
2002, when it was due pursuant to the Lease. 
16. Sometime after the 1st of January, Peacock and Anita Lockhart 
("Lockhart"), Wasatch's property managers, confronted Skalka regarding the missed January rent 
payment. 
17. Skalka told them about his termination and Aris's financial trouble, and 
provided copies of the notices he had received from Aris, which indicated that Aris (1) had 
terminated Skalka's employment; (2) was ceasing all operations; and (3) would likely file for 
bankruptcy protection. 
4 
18. Peacock responded to Skalka that Aris's equipment and furniture could 
not be removed from the Premises under any circumstances. 
19. Skalka had already informed Lockhart in late 2001 that Aris would file for 
bankruptcy and that Skalka and the doctors were going to separate from Aris. 
20. By about mid-January 2002, Aris's negotiations with Skalka and the 
Doctors proved unsuccessful, and Aris elected to inventory, remove, and sell its furniture and 
equipment to pay escalating debts. 
21. Aris arranged for the sale of its equipment and furniture, and sent its 
regional manager, Richard Enright, from California to the Premises for this purpose, and 
arranged in advance for a moving company to remove and store all of Aris's property pending its 
sale. 
22. On January 22, 2002, before the moving company was scheduled to arrive 
on the Premises, Enright arrived at the Building and proceeded directly to the Premises, where he 
met Skalka. 
23. Enright informed Skalka that he had come to remove all of Aris's furniture 
and equipment. 
24. Based on Peacock's directive that no property could be removed, Skalka 
refused to permit Enright to remove the equipment and furniture, and advised Enright to speak 
directly to Peacock. 
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25. Skalka escorted Enright to Peacock's office within the Building, and 
introduced Enright to Peacock. Enright identified himself to Peacock as an Aris employee, and 
expressed his intention of removing Aris's equipment and furniture from the Premises. 
26. Peacock refused to release any equipment or furniture to Enright, and 
informed Enright that Aris had abandoned the Premises and had defaulted under the Lease by 
failing to pay its January rent. As a result, according to Peacock, Wasatch was entitled to seize 
Aris's personal property. 
27. Enright tendered a check to Peacock for the January rent, but Peacock 
responded that Wasatch would not accept it. 
28. While Enright was in Peacock's office, Peacock was contacted via 
telephone by Kathleen Soto ("Soto"), Aris's CFO, who informed him that Enright was an 
authorized representative of Aris, and requested that Peacock release all of Aris's property to 
Enright. 
29. Peacock repeated to Soto that Aris had abandoned the Premises under 
paragraph 20.1 of the Lease, and had defaulted under the Lease by failing to pay its January rent. 
As a result, according to Peacock, Wasatch was entitled to seize Aris's personal property. 
30. Soto responded to Peacock that Aris was pursuing its right under 
paragraph 20.1 of the Lease to remove its personal property before surrendering the premises. 
31. Like Enright, Soto offered to pay the January rent payment immediately 
via wire transfer, but Peacock indicated that such payment was too late and would not be 
accepted. 
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32. After Peacock completed his telephone conversation with Soto, Enright 
again insisted that he be permitted to remove Aris's property. 
33. Instead of releasing Axis' property, however, Peacock directed Enright to 
leave the Premises immediately and threatened to have the police forcefully remove Enright if he 
ever returned again. 
34. Peacock did not contact any other representatives of Aris at that time, nor 
did he ever seek to obtain any contact information for Aris from Wasatch's Logan, Utah, 
headquarters to verify the statements made by Enright and Soto. 
35. Pursuant to Peacock's demand, Enright left the Premises without 
removing any equipment or furniture. 
36. The Court is not persuaded by Peacock's testimony that he turned Enright 
away because he did not know who he was. Peacock conceded that Wasatch's main office would 
have had Aris's California contact information. Yet, Peacock never even sought this information 
before turning Enright away, instead favoring Skalka, whom Peacock knew had been terminated. 
37. On January 23, 2004, the day after Enright's visit to the Premises, Aris 
filed this action seeking replevin of its property and damages. 
38. Shortly after Enright's encounter with Peacock, Erik Olson ("Olson"), 
counsel for Aris, contacted Dahlstrom and requested that Wasatch permit Aris to remove its 
property from the Premises. Olson also tendered in a letter to Dahlstrom Aris's January rent 
payment. 
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39. Dahlstrom refused to release the equipment and furniture to Aris, and did 
not accept the tender of January rent. 
40. Dahlstrom proposed that Aris consider a "business solution" under which 
Aris would sell its equipment and furniture to Skalka and the Doctors, and Skalka and the 
Doctors would assume the Lease obligations to Wasatch. Aris agreed to pursue such an 
arrangement. 
41. However, no one from JDJ or Wasatch disclosed to any representative of 
Aris that Lockhart had been working with Skalka and the Doctors since mid-2001 to set up a 
competing laser eye surgery center in another space within the Building at a more advantageous 
rent. No one disclosed to Aris that Skalka and the Doctors indeed consummated a new lease 
with Wasatch dated January 1, 2002, for another space within the Building that had been vacant 
for some time. Wasatch had a tremendous amount of vacant space in 2001 and 2002. 
42. There is no credible evidence that Wasatch had attempted at any time prior 
to January 22, 2002, to negotiate with Skalka and the Doctors to remain in the Premises, rather 
than relocate to another suite within the Building. 
43. By relocating Skalka and the Doctors within the Building, Wasatch 
intended to eliminate that vacancy and then look to Aris for payment of the full rent for the 
Premises. 
44. With Skalka and the Doctors relocated and Aris in financial trouble, 
Wasatch believed that holding Aris's personal property was a way to insure that JDJ would be 
paid under the Lease. Moreover, by providing to Skalka and the Doctors a substantially more 
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favorable lease in the same building, Wasatch made it unlikely that the Doctors would assume 
Aris's lease. 
45. No agreement was reached among Aris, Wasatch, Skalka, and the Doctors 
with respect to re-leasing the Premises to Skalka and the Doctors. 
46. On or shortly after February 9, 2002, Skalka and the Doctors vacated the 
Premises and relocated within the Building pursuant to their new lease. Wasatch never 
supervised Skalka and the Doctors' move or retrieved their key to the Premises. 
47. Sometime after Skalka and the Doctors vacated the Premises, Wasatch 
changed the locks to the Premises, but never provided a key to Aris and never advised Aris that 
the locks had been changed. 
48. On February 15, 2002, Aris served on Dahlstrom a motion for a writ of 
replevin in which Aris sought a Court order restoring to Aris all of its personal property located 
on the Premises. The Court scheduled a hearing on the motion for February 26, 2002, and 
Dahlstrom received notice of the hearing on the 21st of February. 
49. After receiving the motion for writ of replevin and the notice of hearing, 
Dahlstrom did not relent. He informed Olson that he would oppose the motion for writ of 
replevin. 
50. Dahlstrom asked for more time to prepare for the hearing, and Olson 
agreed to postpone the hearing until March 5, 2002. 
51. In the days leading up to the hearing, Dahlstrom never conceded that Aris 
was entitled to replevin of its personal property. Rather, he indicated his intention to oppose the 
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motion for writ of replevin, and warned that Aris would have to post a bond of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to secure the writ. 
52. Based on Dahlstrom's opposition to the replevin and insistence on a 
sizeable bond, Aris agreed to postpone indefinitely the March 5, 2002, hearing and work with 
Wasatch to locate a new tenant for the Premises. 
53. By agreeing to postpone the writ of replevin hearing and by working with 
Wasatch to find a new tenant for the Premises, neither Olson nor Aris ever intended to waive, 
settle, or release any claims set forth in this action, including its claims for replevin, conversion, 
wrongful eviction, and forcible detainer. 
54. In fact, there was no settlement at all between Aris and Wasatch. Olson 
and Aris's agreement with Wasatch was nothing more than an agreement to postpone the 
litigation to find any tenant who could use the space, as a means of reducing JDJ's claimed 
damages, avoiding the expense to Aris of posting a bond to secure the release of its property, and 
determining whether a settlement between Aris and Wasatch could be reached. 
55. Aris did not postpone the replevin hearing for the narrow purpose of 
attempting to re-let the premises to another laser surgery center tenant. While Aris attempted to 
make the best of the situation (such as locating Ed Barber and attempting to place Barber's group 
in the space), it was a remote possibility that a laser eye surgery tenant would relocate to the 
space when Skalka and the doctors conducted the same business downstairs. 
56. After the writ of replevin hearing was stricken from the Court's calendar, 
Dahlstrom and Olson worked together for a few months to resolve this matter in a manner that was 
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equitable for both sides. However, Mr. Peacock and other agents of Wasatch did not share this 
spirit of negotiation or understanding of an appropriate resolution. 
57. On various occasions between March and June 2002, Aris representatives 
were provided very limited, supervised access to the Premises. Access was granted only if Aris 
first obtained Wasatch's permission and was accompanied by Peacock, who was the only 
individual with a key to the Premises. 
58. Each visit was coordinated with and supervised by Peacock, who would 
unlock the door and stand guard on the Premises. As Peacock conceded, it was his job to 
supervise visitation to the Premises and "safeguard" Aris's property. According to Peacock, 
"safeguard" meant that he was not to allow anyone—including Aris—to take any equipment or 
furniture out of the Building. 
59. During these visits to the Premises, Aris inventoried its personal property. 
Enright discovered that three pieces of equipment had been removed from the Premises between 
his January 22, 2002, visit and his March 2002 inventory: 
a. Statim autoclave (item 230 on PL Ex. 21); 
b. Compaq laptop (item 601 on PL Ex. 21); and 
c. Hansatome microkeratome (item 1137 on PL Ex. 21). 
60. Additionally, Enright discovered that several pairs of high-end sunglasses 
were removed from the premises between January 22, 2002, and March 2002. 
61. Aris's inventories also discovered that two of Aris's lasers had sustained 
damage after Aris was excluded from the Premises. According to credible testimony by Soto, 
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which was uncontroverted, one laser's microscope was broken off, rendering the laser 
inoperable, and the assembly head covers on two lasers (including the laser with the damaged 
scope) were also damaged, rendering the lasers inoperable. 
62. Credible testimony from Soto established that these two damaged lasers 
had been operable immediately prior to Skalka and the Doctors vacating the Premises because 
VISX, the laser manufacturer, had issued "key cards" to Skalka and the Doctors enabling them to 
use the lasers up until they vacated on or about February 9, 2002. Thus, the damage sustained by 
the lasers occurred at the time—or after—Skalka and the Doctors vacated. 
63. During one supervised visit to the Premises, Aris and Olson convinced 
Peacock to release one small piece of equipment, but Peacock confirmed that no other articles 
were to be removed. 
64. On May 20, 2002, Aris memorialized an asset purchase agreement, under 
which Aris agreed to sell a few pieces of its equipment to Ed Barber, who operated a laser eye 
surgery center, for $35,000 cash. Aris and Wasatch also attempted to persuade Barber to 
negotiate a new lease for the Premises. Barber ultimately was interested only in purchasing the 
equipment, and not leasing the Premises. 
65. Olson sought Dahlstrom's consent to the sale based on Wasatch's prior 
edict that no equipment or furniture be removed, and sent to Dahlstrom for his review a copy of 
an asset purchase agreement between Aris and Barber. Dahlstrom indicated that he would check 
with Wasatch, but did not anticipate any problem. 
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66. Olson arranged with Peacock and Barber a meeting on the Premises— 
supervised by Peacock—to close the equipment sale on June 10, 2002. Olson, Enright, and Soto 
attended the meeting for Aris. Barber attended the meeting. Glen McKay represented Wasatch 
at the meeting, along with Peacock. At the meeting, Aris and Barber signed the asset purchase 
agreement for the $35,000 of Aris's equipment. 
67. During the meeting, Olson telephoned Dahlstrom from the Premises to 
confirm that the sale could proceed, but Dahlstrom forbade it, indicating that Wasatch had not yet 
approved the transaction. Aris then left the meeting without the $35,000, and Barber left the 
meeting without the equipment. 
68. A few days later, Dahlstrom telephoned Olson and indicated that Wasatch 
would only permit Aris to sell the equipment to Barber if Aris paid the entire $35,000 proceeds 
to Wasatch. 
69. On or about June 19, 2002, Salt Lake County posted a notice of seizure on 
the Premises setting forth an indebtedness from Aris in the amount of $14,210 for property taxes 
and related fees. 
70. Shortly after the notice of seizure was posted on the Premises, Peacock 
changed the locks on the Premises a second time. Again, he failed to notify Aris that he had 
changed the locks, and failed to provide a key to any representative of Aris. 
71. At or about the time Peacock changed the locks a second time, Soto 
traveled from California to the Premises with the intention of breaking the locks on the Premises 
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doors and removing all of Aris's property. She had contacted a locksmith and moving company 
for these purposes. 
72. However, discovering the notice of seizure posted on the Premises, Soto 
went to the Salt Lake County Assessor's office and paid the entire indebtedness. She then 
decided not to proceed with the locksmith and moving company that day because it appeared that 
Wasatch employees were guarding the Premises. 
73. Shortly after Soto's visit to the Premises, Olson contacted Dahlstrom and 
informed him that Aris had no intention of paying any proceeds from the Barber sale to Wasatch, 
and intended instead to proceed with the lawsuit, including the writ for replevin of Aris's 
equipment and furniture. 
74. On or about June 25, 2002, Dahlstrom informed Olson for the first time 
that Wasatch never intended to withhold any of Aris's personal property and that Aris was 
entitled to remove it all. 
75. Peacock received an e-mail from Lockhart on June 26, 2002, directing him 
to release Aris's property. Peacock responded to Lockhart, "Is this correct?" Lockhart then 
replied to Peacock that Aris was now allowed to take all of its personal property from the 
Premises. 
76. The Court finds that the directive Peacock received from Lockhart on June 
26 and 28, 2002, to release Aris's equipment and furniture was a change from previous 
instructions. Based on Peacock and Lockhart's e-mail exchange, the Court finds that Peacock 
previously had been instructed not to allow Aris to remove its equipment and furniture. 
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77. On July 2, 2002, Soto removed all of Aris's personal property from the 
Premises, and sold a portion of the equipment to Barber for $35,000 as previously agreed. 
78. As both Soto and Aris's expert, Richard Holdren ("Holdren"), testified, 
laser surgery equipment depreciates extremely rapidly and becomes obsolete because new 
models are released every 12 to 18 months. As Soto's credible testimony indicated, Aris could 
have obtained $200,000 for the lasers in January 2002 and only $55,000 to $60,000 for the lasers 
in July 2002. 
79. As detailed in Holdren's report, the total amount by which Aris's personal 
property depreciated while it was within Wasatch's custody is $118,568.81. Wasatch did not call 
any rebuttal expert or otherwise offer any rebuttal testimony relating to the depreciation of Aris's 
property. 
80. As Holdren's uncontroverted expert testimony established, the value of the 
three items of equipment that became missing from the Premises between January 22, 2002, and 
Enright's inventory in March and April 2002 was as follows at the time Aris was permitted to 
remove its property from the Premises: 
a. Statim autoclave (item 230 on PL Ex. 21): $393.60; 
b. Compaq laptop (item 601 on PL Ex. 21): $574.98; and 
c. Hansatome microkeratome (item 1137 on PL Ex. 21): $14,164.68. 
81. As credible, uncontroverted testimony from Enright established, the value 
of the missing sunglasses was $985.56. 
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82. After removing its personal property from the Premises, Aris sold the two 
damaged lasers to VISX, which credited the value of the lasers against Aris's debt to VISX. As 
Soto's credible, uncontroverted testimony established, based on the damage that the lasers had 
sustained, VISX deducted $53,000 from the credit Aris received. The third laser was sold to 
VISX at a loss. 
83. While the three lasers had been secured by collateralized loans to 
Newcourt Financial and Imperial Bank, Aris paid off both of those loans sometime after Aris was 
enabled to remove the lasers from the Premises. 
84. Wasatch produced no credible evidence at trial to controvert Soto's 
credible testimony that Aris owned all of the personal property on the Premises, including the 
three lasers. 
85. Neither Wasatch nor JDJ has ever had a property interest in any of the 
furniture or equipment that was located on the Premises. Nor was any credible evidence received 
at trial of other potential claimants to Aris's personal property, much less claimants who had 
authorized Wasatch to seize the property. 
86. Wasatch knew as early as January 22, 2002, that Aris wanted access to the 
Premises to remove its belongings. From this date up until the date Soto removed Aris's 
property, Wasatch refused repeated requests by Aris representatives for permission to remove 
Aris's property. On multiple occasions, Wasatch prevented Aris from entering into the Premises 
with intent to deprive Aris of such entry. 
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87. During this period, Aris did not have free and unfettered access to the 
Premises nor could it remove its personal property from the Premises. From the time Wasatch 
changed the locks, Aris had no keys to the Premises. As a result, Aris could have removed its 
equipment and furniture only by breaking into the Premises, obtaining a Court order, or receiving 
Wasatch's permission. 
88. Wasatch never sought the assistance of the Court in evicting Aris, taking 
possession of the Premises, or taking possession of Aris's personal property. 
89. While Aris's personal property was in Wasatch's custody, Wasatch was 
not merely safeguarding the property for Aris or for potential claimants to the property, nor did 
Wasatch consider Aris's property to be merely "stored" at the Premises. To the contrary, because 
Wasatch knew that Aris was in financial trouble, Wasatch refused to allow Aris's personal 
property to be released, and instead used it as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Aris with 
respect to the payment of rent. 
90. There is no credible evidence that Aris ever vacated the Premises prior to 
January 22, 2002. Likewise, there is no credible evidence that Aris intended or offered to 
surrender the Lease, much less any evidence that Wasatch or JDJ intended to accept such 
surrender. Rather, Aris's personal property remained on the Premises, and Skalka and the 
Doctors continued to occupy the Premises until February 9, 2002. 
91. Since Peacock refused to release Aris's personal property—thus 
preventing Aris from selling it and reaching a settlement with Wasatch—Aris was unable to 
surrender the lease. 
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92. On or about July 24, 2002, JDJ entered into a new lease for the Premises 
with Utah Financial. Utah Financial took occupancy of the Premises on September 1, 2002. 
93. Since relocating within the Building, Skalka and the Doctors have 
negotiated with Wasatch to build out a new, larger surgery center for them in an expensive, main-
floor-level space in an adjacent building owned by JDJ. 
94. As of January 4, 2002, Aris did not conduct any further business in Utah, 
apart from the isolated transaction of selling $35,000 of equipment to Barber. Aris negotiated to 
sell equipment in Utah to Barber and no one else. The asset purchase agreement with Barber was 
negotiated on May 20, 2002, and the sale would have closed on June 10, 2002, had not Wasatch 
refused to allow the equipment to be released. 
95. On May 23, 2002, Aris's registration to do business in Utah expired for 
failure to file a renewal. 
96. In the answer that Wasatch and JDJ filed in this action, Wasatch and JDJ 
never raised insufficiency of process as an affirmative defense, nor did they allege any failure to 
comply with indorsement provisions or other requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8 (2002). 
97. Based on the affidavit of attorney fees of R. Stephen Marshall, the Court 
finds that Aris has incurred attorney fees in connection with this action in the amount of 
$ 
98. Based on the affidavit of attorney fees of R. Stephen Marshall, the Court 
finds that Aris has incurred costs and necessary disbursements in connection with this action in 
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the amount of $ . The Court finds that these items are correct and have 
been incurred necessarily and in good faith in this action. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Inherent in the Lease is the right of Aris to free, unfettered access to the 
Premises. The limited, supervised inspection opportunities that Wasatch offered to Aris were not 
an adequate substitute for the type of free access that accompany leasehold rights and 
privileges. Inherent in the Lease is the right of the tenant to have a key to the Premises. Aris 
did not need to ask for a key to access its own property. 
2. Wasatch had no authority under Utah law to exclude Aris from the 
Premises without judicial process and thereby exclude Aris from removing its personal 
property. 
3. By agreeing to postpone the writ of replevin hearing and working with 
Wasatch to find a new tenant for the Premises, Aris did not waive, settle, or release any claims 
set forth in this action, including its claims for replevin, conversion, wrongful eviction, and 
forcible detainer. There was no settlement between Aris and Wasatch. 
4. At all relevant times, Peacock, Lockhart, and Dahlstrom were acting 
within the scope of their employment by Wasatch. 
5. At all relevant times, Wasatch and its employees were acting as authorized 
agents of JDJ. All of Wasatch's actions in this matter were within the scope of its agency. 
6. JDJ is the "owner" of the Premises as that term is defined in Utah Code 
Ann. §78-36-12.3(2) (2002). 
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7. By the acts of Wasatch, JDJ's duly authorized agent, JDJ willfully and 
unlawfully excluded Aris from the Premises without judicial process in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-36-12 (2002). 
8. Wasatch and JDJ's exclusion of Aris from the Premises and denial of 
access to Aris's personal property (including removal of the same) constituted a wrongful 
eviction and conversion. 
9. Wasatch and JDJ's forceful, unlawful possession of the Premises during 
Aris's tenancy constituted a forcible detainer as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-2 
(2002). 
10. Wasatch and JDJ were not acting as—and had no authority to act as— 
agents of Salt Lake County, Imperial Bank, Newcourt Financial, or any other creditor of Aris 
when Wasatch and JDJ seized Aris's equipment and furniture. 
11. Likewise, the facts of Aris's collateralized loans or the June 19, 2002, tax 
lien notice provide no excuse for Wasatch and JDJ's conversion of Aris's personal property. 
12. As Wasatch and JDJ conceded at trial, the Lease did not provide a security 
interest to JDJ or Wasatch. Absent such a security interest, JDJ and Wasatch had no right to self-
help seizure of the equipment and furniture on the Premises. 
13. Aris is entitled to an award of damages against Wasatch and JDJ, jointly 
and severally, in the amount of all damages proximately caused by Wasatch and JDJ's wrongful 
eviction, conversion, and forcible detainer. 
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14. The wrongful eviction, conversion, and forcible detainer each proximately 
caused the following damages to Aris: 
a. $ 118,568.81, representing the depreciation of Aris's equipment and 
furniture for the time period in which Wasatch and JDJ deprived Aris of the 
property located on the Premises; 
b. $16,118.82, representing the aggregate value of the statim 
autoclave, Compaq laptop, and hansatome microkeratome, and sunglasses that 
were missing from the Premises; 
c. $53,000.00, representing the damage that Aris's lasers sustained 
while in Wasatch and JDJ's possession. 
15. Pursuant to the forcible detainer statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3) 
(2002), Aris is entitled to a mandatory trebling of its damages against Wasatch and JDJ, jointly 
and severally, which totals $563,062.90 (three times the total damages in the amount of 
$187,687.63). 
16. The Court does not conclude that Aris is entitled to punitive damages 
against Wasatch or JDJ because Aris has not met its burden of showing that Wasatch or JDJ's 
actions demonstrate a knowing and reckless indifference toward, or disregard of, Aris's rights. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (2002). 
17. Aris is entitled to recover its security deposit in the amount of $13,393.89. 
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18. Wasatch did not accept Aris's tender of its January, 2002, rent. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-1. Nevertheless, as Aris conceded at trial, Aris's damages must be offset 
by the amount of the January rent due, $9,556.38. 
19. JDJ's obligation under the Lease to provide free, unfettered access to the 
Premises and any personal property located on the Premises, and Aris's obligation under the 
Lease to make rental payments, were mutually dependent leasehold covenants. 
20. Based on the doctrine of mutually dependent covenants recognized in 
Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 374-78 (Utah 1996), and other 
authorities set forth therein, the Court concludes that when JDJ and Wasatch wrongfully evicted 
Aris and excluded Aris from the entirety of the Premises (including prohibiting Aris from 
accessing and removing its property), Aris's rental obligations were abated in their entirety. 
21. Moreover, based on Wasatch and JDJ's improper conduct, the Lease was 
terminated and Aris was relieved of any further obligations thereunder. 
22. JDJ's counterclaim should therefore be dismissed. 
23- Pursuant to Paragraph 26.17 of the Lease and Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-
10(3), Aris is entitled to recover from Wasatch and JDJ its attorney's fees and costs. 
24. After evaluating a number of factors, including the difficulty of the 
litigation, the efficiency of Aris's attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the 
number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar 
services, the amount involved in the case, the result attained, and the expertise and experience of 
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the lawyers involved, the Court concludes that Aris is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney 
fees in the amount of $ . 
25. Aris is also entitled to an award of necessarily incurred costs and 
disbursements in the amount of $ . 
26. Aris's sale of $35,000 of equipment to Barber did not constitute 
"transacting business" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1501(l) (2001). 
27. Additionally and alternatively, the sale to Barber was merely an "isolated 
transaction" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1501(2)(j) (2001). If not for 
Wasatch's seizure of Aris's personal property, the sale of equipment would have been 
consummated within 30 days. 
28. Aris did not "transact business" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 
16-10a-1501(l) (2001) at any time after it ceased operations in Utah on January 4, 2002. 
29. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1501 (3) (2001), Aris was authorized 
to bring and prosecute this action. As a result, JDJ and Wasatch's motion to dismiss should be 
denied. 
30. Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Wasatch and 
JDJ have waived any defense of insufficiency of process or failure to comply with indorsement 
requirements or other provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8 (2002). 
31. There is no evidence or authority to support either a surrender or 
acceptance. Aris never surrendered its tenancy to JDJ, nor did Aris at any point in time ever 
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"abandon" the Premises as "abandonment" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12.3 and 
Fashion Place Assocs. v. Glad Rags, Inc., 754 P.2d 940, 941 (Utah 1988). 
32. Service of process on defendants David Skalka, Brian Skalka, and Dennis 
Peacock has not been made and as a result, claims against these three defendants should be 
dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this IQ day of Febwary, 2004. 




Leslie A. Lewis 
Third District Judge 
c9^h ic^-fii'*^ ^j-^^^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this °[ day of March, 2004, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was served via hand-delivery to 
the following: 
Todd D. Weiler 
Parry Anderson & Gardiner 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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